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Abstract
In this paper, we construct a tractable endogenous growth model to examine heterogeneous in-
cumbents’ current technology-switching behavior. Then, we examine the effects of policies such as
a subsidy for innovation by incumbents, a subsidy for innovation by entrants, and the extension of
patent length. Our setting suggests interesting and counterintuitive results. High quality incumbents
tend to be less likely to conduct innovation, which is inconsistent with Schumpeter’s hypothesis. A
subsidy for innovation by entrants decreases the average quality of differentiated goods. Moreover,
it may decrease the growth rate of the economy if the positive spillover of innovation from average
quality production is adequately large. Aggregate innovation can be small even when the population
size is large if the barriers to entry are extremely high.
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1 Introduction
Since the eighteenth century, the world economy has grown through the accumulation of capital stock,
population growth, and technological improvements. Technological improvements, which are the result
of research and development (R&D) activities, have perhaps played the most important role for economic
development in recent years. Many researchers have examined the effects of R&D activities via an en-
dogenous R&D-based growth model. First, Romer (1990), Segerstrom, Anant and Dinopoulos (1990),
Grossman and Helpman (1991), and Aghion and Howitt (1992) constructed very simple R&D-based
growth models that focused solely on innovation by entrants (or followers).1 The weak point of these
models is that they cannot examine the innovative activity of incumbents (or leaders).2 Second, Thomp-
son and Waldo (1994), Aghion, Harris, and Vickers (1997), Peretto (1998), Segerstrom and Zornierek
(1999), Aghion, Harris, Howitt, and Vickers (2001), Etro (2004), Segerstrom (2007), Ledezma (2013), and
Kiedaisch (2015) construct advanced R&D-based growth models that can examine the innovative activity
of incumbents and leaders that have technological superiority or first move advantage. These models still
have weak points in that they cannot capture the heterogeneity of innovative activity by incumbents or
they restrict their analysis to a particular industry.3 Recently, Klette and Kortum (2004), Acemoglu
and Akcigit (2012), Denicolo and Zanchettin (2012), Acemoglu and Cao (2015), Akcigit and Kerr (2018),
Parello (2019), and Iwaisako and Ohki (2019) attempted to construct more advanced R&D-based growth
models that can examine the innovative activity of both heterogeneous incumbents and entrants (or both
heterogeneous leaders and followers) in many industries. The present paper examines a series of these
studies.4
The present paper considers innovation by both heterogeneous incumbents and entrants. Incumbents
are heterogeneous in the quality of their invented differentiated goods and efficiency of production, which
are drawn from an exogenous distribution when they invent new goods. The contribution of our paper
is that we consider the incumbents’ technology-switching behavior. We assume that the quality of their
invented differentiated goods declines exogenously with the passage of time, which decreases their instan-
1Followers are defined as firms once having state-of-the-art technology that have been leapfrogged by another firm.
2Bartelsman and Doms (2000) report that 75 percent of total factor productivity growth results from R&D activities
by incumbent firms.
3In the real economy, there are many industries, so firm size and strategic incentives differ, and industries can act
heterogeneously with the same economic policy.
4Some studies examine economic growth or welfare under firm heterogeneity, without, however, examining the endoge-
nous innovative activity of heterogeneous incumbents (or leaders): Melitz (2003), Minniti, Parello, and Segerstrom (2013),
Chu, Cozzi, Furukawa, and Liao (2017), and Chu, Cozzi, Fan, Furukawa, and Liao (2019).
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taneous profit. Then, incumbents decide to wash their hands of current technology and switch to new
technology. The timing of the switch is determined endogenously. When they switch to new technology,
they disrupt their current position to obtain a new sequential profit flow. In this paper, we call this
incumbent behavior “disruptive innovation”, which is defined by Christensen (1997). Using this model,
we examine how a subsidy (tax) for innovation by entrants, a subsidy (tax) for innovation by incumbents,
and the extension (shortening) of patent length affect the growth rate of an economy and the average
quality of differentiated goods.
The main results of our analysis are as follows. First, incumbents with high-quality products tend not
to conduct disruptive innovation. This result is inconsistent with Schumpeter’s hypothesis; however, it is
consistent with the finding of Christensen (1997), who observed this in, for example, the hard-disk and
excavating equipment industries. From this point of view, the present paper examines the relationship
between economic growth and R&D activity, analytically capturing the exciting property discovered by
Christensen (1997). 5 Second, in our basic model, a subsidy for innovation by entrants, a subsidy for
innovation by incumbents, and the extension of patent length increase the growth rate of the economy.
This result is consistent with the idea that generous treatment of firms stimulates the incentive to entry,
which is pointed out in many related studies. Third, a subsidy for innovation by entrants decreases
the average quality of differentiated goods, while that for innovation by incumbents and an extension of
patent length increase it. In our model, average quality is an increasing function of disruptive innovation
by incumbents. It is then a natural result that a subsidy for innovation by incumbents increases the
average quality of differentiated goods because it stimulates the incentive to conduct disruptive innovation.
Extension of patent length also stimulates disruptive innovation by incumbents because, as noted above,
it stimulates innovation by entrants, which decreases the instantaneous profit of incumbents. A decrement
of instantaneous profit decreases the incentive to put off disruptive innovation, thereby stimulating the
incentive to conduct disruptive innovation. 6 A subsidy for innovation by entrants has two opposite
effects on the incentive to conduct disruptive innovation. On one hand, it decreases the instantaneous
profit of incumbents, which increases the incentive to engage in disruptive innovation. On the other
hand, it decreases the expected benefit from disruptive innovation, which increases the incentive to put
5In the economic context, except for our paper, Igami (2017) examines the theory of Christensen (1997), focusing on
the evolution of market structure using the empirical industrial organization literature.
6This result is interesting in that the extension of patent length makes incumbents producing at not so high quality
switch their current technology earlier.
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off disruptive innovation. We show analytically that the latter effect always dominates the former, and
that a subsidy for innovation by entrants decreases the average quality of differentiated goods. Fourth,
if the positive spillover of innovation from average quality is sufficiently large, a subsidy for innovation
by entrants does decrease the growth rate of the economy. This counterintuitive result comes from
our original framework in which heterogeneous incumbents conduct disruptive innovation. A subsidy
for innovation by entrants decreases average quality, which decreases the expected benefit of conducting
disruptive innovation. This effect decreases the value of incumbents given the growth rate of the economy,
and then the growth rate of the economy must decrease to satisfy the free entry condition. In section
3.2, we show analytically that this phenomenon dominates the effect that a subsidy for innovation by
entrants decreases the cost of entry when the positive spillover of innovation from average quality is
sufficiently large. Fifth, if there is no negative externality of innovation from market size, and if barriers
to entry are extremely high, then aggregate innovation is small when population size is large. This
counterintuitive result also comes from our new framework in which heterogeneous incumbents conduct
disruptive innovation. When barriers to entry are extremely high, the number of entrants goes to zero.
Then, innovation is conducted only by incumbents. Large population size makes instantaneous profit high
if there is no negative externality of innovation from market size, which increases the incentive to put
off switching from current technology. As shown in section 3.3, this effect decreases aggregate disruptive
innovation. 7
Recently, the definition of innovation has become increasingly diverse, and some studies examine di-
verse innovation simultaneously.8 On one hand, innovation to create new products and capture market
leadership is defined as “exploration innovation”, “product innovation”, and “external innovation”. On
the other hand, innovation to improve product lines that they are currently serving is defined as “ex-
ploitation innovation”, “process innovation”, “internal innovation”, and “incremental innovation”.9 In
this context, our model is interpreted as follows. On one hand, entrants conduct innovation to capture
market leadership; this innovation is categorized as “ exploration innovation”, “product innovation”, and
7Although in the present paper, disruptive innovation does not affect the growth rate of the economy directly, this
result may be one of the explanations of the scale effect puzzle: many related papers construct endogenous growth models
showing that the growth rate of the economy is high when population size is large; however, Jones (1995) pointed out
that empirical studies do not support this result. By changing our setting with felicity, one can construct a model in
which disruptive innovation by incumbents affects the growth rate of the economy directly, and that may show that large
population size discourages innovation where barriers to entry are high, which offsets the effect that large population size
encourages economic growth through innovation by entrants.
8See Acemoglu and Cao (2015) and Akcigit and Kerr (2018).
9Some papers define “radical innovation” or “drastic innovation” as innovation in which the degree of progress is large
or invention is epoch-making.
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“external innovation”. On the other hand, incumbents conduct innovation to switch from the aged prod-
uct lines they are currently serving to a new one; this activity cannot be categorized under the above
definition. Following Christensen (1997), we define this activity as “disruptive innovation”.
Most related literature on the innovative activity of both heterogeneous incumbents and entrants
examines “exploitation innovation”, “process innovation”, “internal innovation”, and “incremental inno-
vation” by incumbents, and “exploration innovation”, “product innovation”, and “external innovation”
by entrants or incumbents. One exception is Iwaisako and Ohki (2019). 10 They unintentionally ex-
amine the “disruptive innovation” by leaders using the extended quality ladder model. In their model,
the quality advantage over followers is caused by the exogenous distribution, and then heterogeneity
exists between leaders. Their unique setting is that leaders have the opportunity to redraw the quality
advantage, and then leaders abandon their current position and innovate to earn a larger profit flow. 11
They find a negative relationship between the quality of the invented good and leaders’ motivation to
conduct innovation, which is also found in the present paper. This result is contrary to Schumpeter’s
hypothesis that large firms tend to conduct R&D activity proportionally more than smaller ones, which
is supported by Acemoglu and Cao (2015) and Akcigit and Kerr (2018) in the theoretical context by
analyzing “incremental innovation” by incumbents.12 However, this difference is natural because the def-
inition of innovation in their model is clearly different, and our result is consistent with Christensen’s idea
that large firms tend to conduct large “incremental innovation” but much less “disruptive innovation”.
In the near future, progressive technology, such as solid-state batteries and artificial intelligence, will
play a role in reconstructing existing markets, and the presence of “disruptive innovation” is expected
to rise. We think both “incremental innovation” and “disruptive innovation” play important roles in the
development of the economy, so the relationships between these two types of innovation and economic
10The model constructed in the present paper and that constructed by Iwaisako and Ohki (2019) are completely different
except on one point: both models consider “disruptive innovation”. The present model is based on the variety expansion
model; however, Iwaisako and Ohki (2019) is based on the quality ladder model. On that point, their model cannot examine
the effect of extending patent length. Additionally, they cannot capture the relative obsolescence effect, which plays a crucial
role in section 3.2 in our paper, unless generalizing the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function. The present
model also constructs a general equilibrium; however, Iwaisako and Ohki (2019) use a quasi-linear utility function. Although
this assumption makes analysis easy, it restricts the range of analysis, and their model cannot examine the resource effect
as examined in section 3.3. The reason they choose such a setting in spite of these weak points is that their model can
capture the intensity of innovative activity, and the probability of successful innovation is determined endogenously, which
makes distribution of incumbents important. (In the present model, the probability of success is assumed to be one, and
key endogenous variables do not depend on the distribution of incumbents.) In their model, growth rate of the economy is
affected through the change of the endogenous distribution of incumbents, the “distribution effect”, which is never obtained
from the present or related papers.
11Because they do not consider absolute or relative obsolescence, and their setting permits followers to leapfrog, the
leaders’ motivation for innovation is simply earning higher profits. The important point is that leaders abandon their
current position, and this setting shows the typical property of “disruptive innovation”.
12Cohen and Levin (1989) and Cohen (1995) provide a survey related to Schumpeter’s hypothesis.
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growth models have to be examined carefully. This paper is the first step in this research plan.
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we construct a general equilibrium
model without specifying R&D technology. As for the homogeneous growth model, the properties of the
long-run equilibrium crucially depend on the specification of R&D technology. In section 3.1, we construct
the simplest model in which the degree of innovation by incumbents and entrants are independent of
labor market conditions. In section 3.2, we generalize the positive externality from the average quality
of differentiated goods, which is strongly affected by incumbents’ innovation. In section 3.3, we remove
our assumption imposed only for simplicity, and conduct a numerical analysis using a model in which the
degree of innovation by incumbents and entrants is dependent on labor market conditions. In section 3.4,
we remove the positive externality from the number of differentiated goods, and examine the steady-state
equilibrium where the number of differentiated goods is determined endogenously instead of the growth
rate.
2 Model
We construct an infinite representative agent model where the productivity of production and the quality
of differentiated goods, which change as an exogenous law of motion, differ between incumbents. Using
this model, we analyze the relationship between incumbents’ technology-switching behavior, new inven-
tions by entrants, and economic growth. We normalize the wage rate as the numeraire, w(t) = 1. We
focus on the balanced growth path (BGP) equilibrium, where all variables grow at a constant rate.
2.1 Households
There are L (t) households at time t that grow at exogenous rate gL. Household members live forever
and are endowed with one unit of labor, which is supplied inelastically. Each household maximizes its
discounted utility:
U =
∫
∞
0
e−ρtu(t)dt, (1)
where ρ is a subjective discount rate and u(t) represents instantaneous utility from consumption at time
t. Consumption goods are provided by one industry. Within that industry, there is a continuum of
horizontally differentiated goods, and preferences are expressed in the form of a CES in accordance with
5
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977):
u (t) =


n(t)∫
0
q (j, t)x (j, t)
σ−1
σ dj


σ
σ−1
, (2)
where q(j, t) and d(j, t) denote the quality and consumption volume of incumbent j at time t, respectively,
and σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution of differentiated goods.
Solving the static utility maximization problem of the household, we now derive the per capita demand
for each differentiated good:
x (j, t) =
[
q (j, t)
p (j, t)
]σ
P (t)
σ−1
E (t) , (3)
where P (t) =
[
n(t)∫
0
q (j, t)
σ
p (j, t)
−(σ−1)
dj
] −1
σ−1
denotes the price index of differentiated goods at time t,
and E(t) is the per capita expenditure at time t.
Given (3), inter-temporal utility maximization yields E˙(t)
E(t) = r(t)−ρ, where r(t) is the interest rate at
time t. In the BGP equilibrium, the growth rate of expenditure gE is constant. Thus, the interest rate
is also constant, and expressed as:
r = ρ+ gE . (4)
2.2 Production
Each differentiated good is produced by incumbents. They have heterogeneous production technologies
and quality for the goods they produce. Incumbents having productivity φ must hire 1
φ
x units of labor to
produce x units of goods, and there is no fixed cost to produce differentiated goods. The instantaneous
profit of incumbent j is expressed as pi (j, t) = x (j, t)L (t) (p (j, t)− 1), where p (j, t) is the price of
incumbent j. As incumbents supply goods monopolistically, they choose the optimal price p (j, t) =
σ
σ−1
1
φ(j,t) . Using (3), we obtain the incumbents’ quantity of production having productivity φ and quality
q as:
x (j, t)L (t) = [q (j, t)φ (j, t)]
σ
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ
P (t)
σ−1
E (t)L (t) . (5)
We define the composite factor of the incumbents’ property (hereafter referred to as adjusted quality) as:
θ (j, t) ≡ q (j, t)
σ
φ (j, t)
σ−1
. (6)
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Because all incumbents with the same adjusted quality behave symmetrically, we index incumbents
hereafter by θ instead of j. Then, the labor demand, (x/φ)L, and profit, pi, of incumbents having
adjusted quality θ are expressed as:
x (θ, t)L (t)
φ
= θ (t)
σ − 1
σ
E (t)L (t)
Q (t)
, (7)
pi (θ, t) = θ (t)
1
σ
E (t)L (t)
Q (t)
, (8)
where Q (t) ≡ n (t)Θ (t) expresses the improvement level of differentiated goods in this industry, which
is composed of the number of differentiated goods, n (t), and average quality, Θ (t) =
θmax∫
θmin
θµ (θ, t) dθ, at
time t. Here, µ (θ, t) is the distribution of incumbents having adjusted quality θ at time t.13
2.3 Entry
Entrants must hire sFCF (t) units of labor to invent new differentiated goods at time t, and draw an
initial adjusted quality θ0 from a given distribution G (θ0). Here, sF is the subsidy (tax) for innovation
by entrants when sF < 1 (sF > 1). We specify the assumed Pareto distribution as:
14
G (θ0) = 1− θ
−k
0 1 ≤ θ0 <∞ , (9)
where the expected value of θ0 is given by k/(k − 1) , which decreases in k > 1. After the invention,
entrants enter the market and become incumbents. Invented differentiated goods are protected by a
perfect but finite intellectual property rights policy, and then incumbents can supply goods monopolisti-
cally without risk of imitation until their patent protection expires. They can obtain a monopoly profit
throughout T¯ periods at most, where T¯ is patent length. Initial instantaneous profits of an incumbent
entering at time s and drawing θ0 is expressed as:
pi (θ0, 0, s) =
θ0
σ
E (s)L (s)
Q (s)
. (10)
13Although µ (θ, t) must be determined endogenously, the equilibrium of our economy does not depend on µ (θ, t). Thus,
we do not pay attention to µ (θ, t).
14In general, the cumulative distribution function of the Pareto distribution is expressed as
G (θ0) = 1− akθ
−k
0 a ≤ θ0 <∞ . In this paper, we simplify a = 1. Then, the density function is expressed as
g (θ0) = kθ
−(k+1)
0 .
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We assume that the adjusted quality of each incumbent grows at the exogenous rate gθ0 .
15 The number
of households grows at exogenous growth rate gL, and the improvement level of differentiated goods,
Q, and aggregate expenditure, E, grow at endogenous growth rates gQ and gE , respectively. Then, an
instantaneous profit of τ times passed incumbents entering at time s, and drawing θ0 is expressed as:
pi (θ0, τ, s) = exp [− [gQ − gθ − gE − gL] τ ]
θ0
σ
E (s)L (s)
Q (s)
. (11)
2.4 Disruptive Innovation
From (11), instantaneous profits decrease with decreases in own adjusted quality, θ0, which captures
absolute obsolescence or saturation of demand. It also decreases as the improvement level of differenti-
ated goods, Q, increases, which captures the effect of relative obsolescence. In this paper, we consider
that incumbents have the opportunity to wash their hands of current and switch to new technology by
conducting R&D activity. We call this activity disruptive innovation. Incumbents must hire sDCD (t)
units of labor to conduct disruptive innovation, and then invent a new differentiated good and reenter
the market at time t. They draw an initial adjusted quality θ0 from a given distribution G (θ0). Here,
sD is the subsidy (tax) for innovation by incumbents when sD < 1 (sD > 1). We assume that CD (t) is
strictly smaller than CF (t).
16
The value of incumbents entering at time s consists of aggregate discounted instantaneous profits
from time s to the timing of their technology switch and expected discounted net benefit from disruptive
innovation, which is the difference between the expected initial value of incumbents and the cost of
technology-switching. Then, the initial values of incumbents entering at time s and drawing θ0 is expressed
as:
V (θ0, 0, s) =
T˜∫
0
exp [−rτ ]pi (θ0, τ, s) dτ + exp
[
−rT˜
] [
EV
(
s+ T˜
)
− sDCD
(
s+ T˜
)]
. (12)
where EV (t) =
θmax0∫
θmin0
V (θ0, 0, t) dG (θ0) is the expected initial value of incumbents entering at time t,
and T˜ is the timing of conducting disruptive innovation, which is determined to satisfy the following
15When incumbents conduct disruptive innovation, the growth rate of adjusted quality of each incumbent, gθ0 , must be
negative to satisfy a sufficient condition, which is discussed later. In this paper, we assume that gθ0 is constant; thus, gθ0
must be negative.
16This assumption means that incumbents have cost advantages over entrants, and the related literature provides several
plausible interpretations of the assumption; for example, because only incumbents have state-of-the-art technology in their
industries, they have better experience, ability, or knowledge of R&D activities in their industries.
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condition:
pi
(
θ0, T˜ , s
)
= [r − gC ] exp
[
gC T˜
]
[EV (s)− sDCD (s)] , (13)
where gC is the growth rate of innovation cost.
17 This is a necessary condition with respect to T˜ to
maximize (12), and expresses the trade-off between marginal benefit and marginal loss from putting off
the disruptive innovation. When incumbents put off the disruptive innovation, they can obtain additional
instantaneous profits; however, the expected net benefit from disruptive innovation decreases because the
cumulative discount rate of expected net benefit from disruptive innovation increases. If the marginal
benefit from delaying disruptive innovation is larger (smaller) than that of the marginal loss, incumbents
move the timing of disruptive innovation later (forward). Thus, the timing of disruptive innovation is
determined to satisfy that the marginal benefit from delaying the disruptive innovation is equal to that
of the marginal loss. A sufficient condition with respect to T˜ to maximize (12) is expressed as:
− [gQ − gθ − gE ]− gC < 0. (14)
This condition implies that the marginal loss from delaying the disruptive innovation has to increase more
than that of marginal benefit when incumbents conduct disruptive innovation. Equation (13) determines
the interior solution of T˜ as a function of θ0, which corresponds to one-to-one. From (8) and (13), we
can recognize the positive relationship between θ0 and T˜ , and then incumbents drawing high θ0 tend to
engage in disruptive innovation later.
In addition to the case of the interior solution, we have to consider the case of a corner solution. On
one hand, for incumbents drawing low θ0 at time s, the marginal benefit from delaying the disruptive
innovation can be strictly less than that of the marginal loss even at the moment when they enter the
market:
pi (θ0, 0, s)− [r − gC ] [EV (s)− sDCD (s)] < 0.
Incumbents drawing such a low θ0 decide to conduct disruptive innovation immediately, rather than
17We assume, for simplicity, that the growth rate of EV equals that of CD, gEV = gCD ≡ gC , which implies a growth
rate of net benefit from disruptive innovation equal to the growth rate of innovation cost,
d[EV (t)−sDCD(t)]/dt
[EV (t)−sDCD(t)]
= gC . This
assumption is satisfied when cost of disruptive innovation by incumbents and the cost of innovation by entrants grow at
same rate, which can be confirmed later.
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producing differentiated goods. We define the critical level of initial adjusted quality in terms of whether
the incumbent produces as θc10 , which satisfies the following condition:
pi
(
θc10 , 0, s
)
− [r − gC ] [EV (s)− sDCD (s)] = 0. (15)
On the other hand, for incumbents drawing a high θ0 at time s, the marginal benefit from delaying the
disruptive innovation can be strictly greater than that of the marginal loss even at time s+ T¯ :
pi
(
θ0, T¯ , s
)
− [r − gC ] exp
[
gC T¯
]
[EV (s)− sDCD (s)] > 0.
Incumbents drawing such a high θ0 conduct no disruptive innovation before their patent protection
expires. We assume, for simplicity, that incumbents drawing such a high θ0 switch their technology
immediately after their patent protection expires. We define the critical level of initial adjusted quality
in terms of whether the incumbent conducts disruptive innovation before their patent protection expires
as θc20 , which satisfies the following condition:
pi
(
θc20 , T¯ , s
)
− [r − gC ] exp
[
gC T¯
]
[EV (s)− sDCD (s)] = 0. (16)
Thus, we can write the timing of disruptive innovation as a function of initial adjusted quality:
T˜ = 0 for θ0 ≤ θ
c1
0
T˜ = T˜ (θ0) for θ
c1
0 < θ0 < θ
c2
0
T˜ = T¯ for θ0 ≥ θ
c2
0
(17)
where ∂T˜ (θ0)
∂θ0
> 0 is satisfied.
From (11), (13), (15) and (16), we can express θc20 and T˜ (θ0) as a function of θ
c1
0 :
θc20 = exp
[
[−gθ] T¯
]
θc10
T˜ (θ0) =
1
−gθ
ln
[
θ0
θc10
] . (18)
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From (12), we can express the initial values of an incumbent entering at time s and drawing θ0 as:
V0 (θ0, 0, s) = [EV (s)− sDCD (s)] for θ0 ≤ θ
c1
0
V1 (θ0, 0, s) =
T˜ (θ0)∫
0
exp [−rτ ]pi (θ0, τ, s) dτ + exp
[
− [r − gC ] T˜ (θ0)
]
[EV (s)− sDCD (s)] for θ
c1
0 < θ0 ≤ θ
c2
0
V2 (θ0, 0, s) =
T¯∫
0
exp [−rτ ]pi (θ0, τ, s) dτ + exp
[
− [r − gC ] T¯
]
[EV (s)− sDCD (s)] for θ
c2
0 < θ0
,
(19)
where T˜ , θc10 , and θ
c2
0 satisfy (13) and (18), respectively. The first term represents the gain from the
monopoly profit and the second represents the gain from disruptive innovation.18
2.5 Free Entry Condition
When we calculate an expected initial value of incumbents, we have to consider the magnitude of the
correlation between the minimum initial adjusted quality, θmin0 , and the critical level of initial adjusted
quality, θc10 , θ
c2
0 . First, if θ
min
0 ≤ θ
c1
0 is satisfied, we obtain an equilibrium that incumbents drawing
θ0 < θ
c1
0 conduct disruptive innovation immediately, incumbents drawing θ
c1
0 < θ0 < θ
c2
0 conduct disrup-
tive innovation after T˜ (θ0) periods have passed from entry, and incumbents drawing θ
c2
0 ≤ θ0 conduct
disruptive innovation after T¯ periods have passed from the entry. Second, if θc10 < θ
min
0 ≤ θ
c2
0 is satisfied,
we obtain an equilibrium that incumbents drawing θmin0 ≤ θ0 < θ
c2
0 conduct disruptive innovation after
T˜ (θ0) periods have passed from entry, and incumbents drawing θ
c2
0 ≤ θ0 conduct disruptive innovation
after T¯ periods have passed.19 Third, if θc20 < θ
min
0 is satisfied, we obtain an equilibrium in which all
incumbents conduct disruptive innovation after T¯ periods have passed from entry.20 Then, we can express
an expected initial value of incumbents as:
EV =
θc10∫
θmin0
V0 (θ0, 0, s) dG (θ0) +
θc20∫
θc10
V1 (θ0, 0, s) dG (θ0) +
θmax0∫
θc20
V2 (θ0, 0, s) dG (θ0) if θ
min
0 ≤ θ
c1
0
EV =
θc20∫
θmin0
V1 (θ0, 0, s) dG (θ0) +
θmax0∫
θc20
V2 (θ0, 0, s) dG (θ0) if θ
c1
0 < θ
min
0 ≤ θ
c2
0
EV =
θmax0∫
θmin0
V2 (θ0, 0, s) dG (θ0) if θ
c2
0 < θ
min
0
.
(20)
18Incumbents drawing θ0 ≤ θc10 conduct disruptive innovation and gain no monopolistic profit.
19In this case, there are no incumbents conducting disruptive innovation at the moment when they invent.
20In this case, there are no incumbents conducting disruptive innovation before their patent protection expires.
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The free entry condition is satisfied in each period. The expected gain from entry at time t equals to
zero, and we obtain the following condition:
θc10∫
θmin0
V0 (θ0, 0, t) dG (θ0) +
θc20∫
θc10
V1 (θ0, 0, t) dG (θ0) +
θmax0∫
θc20
V2 (θ0, 0, t) dG (θ0) ≤ sFCF (t) if θ
min
0 ≤ θ
c1
0
θc20∫
θmin0
V1 (θ0, 0, t) dG (θ0) +
θmax0∫
θc20
V2 (θ0, 0, t) dG (θ0) ≤ sFCF (t) if θ
c1
0 < θ
min
0 ≤ θ
c2
0
θmax0∫
θmin0
V2 (θ0, 0, t) dG (θ0) ≤ sFCF (t) if θ
c2
0 < θ
min
0
.
(21)
When an equilibrium value of gn is positive, (21) is satisfied with equality. When an equilibrium value
of gn is negative, the expected gain from entry is too small for entrants to enter the market. Then, there
is no new entry, and the number of differentiated goods does not increase.21 Thus, we obtain an interior
equilibrium in which the number of differentiated goods remains constant, gn = 0, if the expected gain
from entry is strictly negative, even when gn = 0.
2.6 Labor Market
From (7), aggregate labor demand for production at time t is:
n (t)
θmax0∫
θmin0
x (θ, t)L (t)
φ
µ (θ, t) dθ =
σ − 1
σ
E (t)L (t) . (22)
Because CF (t) units of labor are required to invent one new differentiated good, n (t) gnCF (t) units of
labor are required to invent n˙ (t) new differentiated goods, where gn ≡ n˙ (t)/n (t) is the growth rate of the
number of differentiated goods. Aggregate labor demand for innovation by entrants at time t is expressed
as:
IF (t) = n (t) gnCF (t) . (23)
21Note that this does not mean that incumbents exit the market.
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Because CD (t) units of labor are required to conduct disruptive innovation, aggregate labor demand for
innovation by incumbents at time t is expressed as:
ID (t) = νn (t)CD, (24)
where ν is the ratio of the number of differentiated goods conducting disruptive innovation to the aggregate
number of differentiated goods, which is expressed as:22
ν =
[θc10 ]
k
[gn+k[−gθ ]]
1−exp[−[gn+k[−gθ]]T¯ ]
− gn if θ
min
0 ≤ θ
c1
0
ν =
[
[θc10 ]
gn
[−gθ ] k[−gθ]
gn+k[−gθ]
+[θc10 ]
−k
exp[−[gn+k[−gθ ]]T¯ ] gn
gn+k[−gθ ]
]
1−
[
[θc10 ]
gn
[−gθ ] k[−gθ]
gn+k[−gθ ]
+[θc10 ]
−k
exp[−[gn+k[−gθ ]]T¯ ] gn
gn+k[−gθ ]
]gn if θc10 < θmin0 ≤ θc20
ν =
exp[−gnT¯ ]
1−exp[−gnT¯ ]
gn if θ
c2
0 < θ
min
0
, (25)
Labor supply is exogenously given, so the labor market clearing condition is:
σ − 1
σ
E (t)L (t) + νn (t)CD (t) + gnn (t)CF (t) = L (t) . (26)
2.7 Average Quality of Differentiated Goods
The average quality of differentiated goods, Θ, is calculated as the sum of the quality of differentiated
goods divided by the number of differentiated goods produced at time t:23
Θ = k
k−1
[
θc10
]
if θmin0 ≤ θ
c1
0
Θ =
[−gθ]
gn+[−gθ]

1−[θc10 ]
gn+[−gθ]
[−gθ]

+ 1
k−1
[
1−[θc10 ]
−[k−1]
exp[−[gn+k[−gθ ]]T¯ ]
]
[−gθ ]
gn
[
1−[θc10 ]
gn
[−gθ]
]
+ 1
k
[
1−[θc10 ]
−k
exp[−[gn+k[−gθ ]]T¯ ]
] if θc10 < θmin0 < θc20
Θ = k
k−1
gn
gn+[−gθ]
[1−exp[−[gn+[−gθ]]T¯ ]]
[1−exp[−[gn]T¯ ]]
if θc20 < θ
min
0
. (27)
If θmin0 ≤ θ
c1
0 is satisfied, Θ is an increasing function of θ
c1
0 and independent from gn and gθ. First, from
(18), high θc10 leads to low T˜ for any incumbents, which means that incumbents drawing θ0 ≤ θ
c2
0 make
disruptive innovation early. Because of absolute obsolescence, this effect makes average quality high.
Second, the average quality of any vintage is identical:
∞∫
θ0(T˜)
exp[gθT˜ ]kθ−k0 dθ0
∞∫
θ0(T˜)
kθ
−(k+1)
0 dθ0
= k
k−1θ
c1
0 . The reason for
22In appendix A, we derive (25).
23In appendix B, we derive (27).
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this is on one hand, the adjusted quality of any incumbent decreases at the rate of gθ. Then, the average
quality of old differentiated goods tends to be low, and this effect becomes large when the absolute value
of gθ is high. On the other hand, incumbents producing low-quality goods conduct disruptive innovation
earlier, and differentiated goods having low adjusted quality goods go out of production over time. This
raises the average quality, and the effect becomes large when the absolute value of gθ is high because a
high absolute value of gθ decreases the incentive to put off disruptive innovation. These two effects offset
completely, irrespective of the value of gθ. Then, the ratio of old to new differentiated goods does not
matter when θmin0 ≤ θ
c1
0 is satisfied.
If θc20 < θ
min
0 is satisfied, Θ is an increasing function of gn, a decreasing function of the absolute value
of gθ, and independent of θ
c1
0 . First, no incumbents conduct disruptive innovation before their patent
protection expires when θc20 < θ
min
0 is satisfied. Then, the adjusted quality of all incumbent decreases at
the rate gθ, and the average quality of old differentiated goods tends to be low. When the absolute value
of gθ is high, the average quality of old differentiated goods rapidly renders them obsolete. Then, the total
average quality is low with a high absolute value of gθ. When gn > 0, the number of old differentiated
goods, which are on average of low quality, is lower than that of new differentiated goods, which are on
average of high quality. This effect becomes large when gn is large, and then, the total average quality
is high with high gn. Second, even an incumbent drawing the lowest initial adjusted quality does not
conduct disruptive innovation until their patent protection expires when θc20 < θ
min
0 is satisfied. Then,
T˜ = T¯ is satisfied for any incumbent, and Θ is not affected by θc10 .
If θc10 < θ
min
0 < θ
c2
0 is satisfied, Θ is an increasing function of θ
c1
0 and gn, and a decreasing function
of the absolute value of gθ. The reason that Θ is an increasing function of θ
c1
0 is the same in the case of
θmin0 ≤ θ
c1
0 . The reason that Θ is an increasing function of gn and a decreasing function of the absolute
value of gθ is as follows: when θ
c1
0 < θ
min
0 < θ
c2
0 is satisfied, there are some periods during which even
an incumbent drawing the lowest initial adjusted quality does not conduct disruptive innovation. Then,
the average quality of old differentiated goods is lower than that of new differentiated goods. Thus, the
total average quality is high with high gn or a low absolute value of gθ, which is similar to the case of
θc20 < θ
min
0 .
Regardless of the difference between θc10 and θ
min
0 , Θ is a decreasing function of k, and is constant as
long as θc10 is constant.
24 Because the improvement level of differentiated goods is Q (t) ≡ n (t)Θ, the
24Note that the expected value of θ0 is a decreasing function of k.
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growth rate of improvement level of differentiated goods is expressed as:
gQ = gn. (28)
2.8 Growth Rate
We call the growth rate of this economy the growth rate of instantaneous utility. Substituting (5) and
(6) into (2) yields:
u (t) = Q (t)
1
σ−1
σ − 1
σ
E (t) . (29)
Then, the growth rate of this economy is expressed as
gu =
1
σ − 1
gQ + gE . (30)
3 Equilibrium
In the previous section, we constructed a closed model; however, we have yet to specify the innovation
technology. The property of the long-run equilibrium is crucially dependent on how we specify the
innovation technology; therefore, we derive several types of equilibriums by specifying several forms of
innovation technology.
3.1 The Case Where CF (t) =
E(t)L(t)
Q(t)
cF and CD (t) =
E(t)L(t)
Q(t)
cD
In this section, we specify the innovation technology as:
CF (t) =
E(t)L(t)
Q(t) cF CD (t) =
E(t)L(t)
Q(t) cD
. (31)
These technology functions contain a positive externality from the improvement level of differentiated
goods, and a negative externality from market scale.25 By specifying this formula, we can derive the
simplest BGP equilibrium, where the equilibrium value of θc10 , θ
c2
0 , T˜ (θ0), gQ, and Θ, which are important
25When the improvement level of differentiated goods is high, much knowledge is accumulated, and then, innovation
cost tends to be low. When the market scale is large, the costs of marketing their differentiated goods or research are high.
Then, the innovation cost, as an initial investment cost of releasing a new differentiated good, tends to be high.
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endogenous variables in this paper, are determined independent of the labor market clearing condition.
Another merit for this specification is that gQ is independent of population; thus, there is no scale effect.
From (26) and (31), the labor market clearing condition is expressed as:
E (t)
[
σ − 1
σ
+ ν
cD
Θ
+ gQ
cF
Θ
]
= 1. (32)
From (32), in the BGP equilibrium, E (t) must be constant, and we obtain:
gE = 0. (33)
From (31) and (33), the growth rate of the innovation cost is:
gC = gL − gQ. (34)
From (14), (33), and (34), the growth rate of the adjusted quality has to be negative:
gθ < 0. (35)
Substituting (4), (11), (21), (34) and (31) into (13) and (18) yields:
θc10 (gQ) = σ [ρ− gL + gQ] [sF cF − sDcD]
θc20 (gQ) = exp
[
[−gθ] T¯
]
θc10 (gQ)
T˜ (θ0, gQ) =
1
−gθ
ln
[
θ0
θc10 (gQ)
]
. (36)
Equation (36) determines the equilibrium value of θc10 , θ
c2
0 , and T˜ with given gQ. We can confirm
∂T˜ (θ0,gQ)
∂θ0
> 0 and
∂2T˜ (θ0,gQ)
∂θ0∂θ0
< 0, and we get following proposition.
Proposition 3.1. An incumbent drawing a high initial adjusted quality and earning a large profit tends
to invest in disruptive innovation (switch from current technology) later. When patent length is finite,
some incumbents drawing a high initial adjusted quality conduct no disruptive innovation before their
patent protection expires.
This proposition is consistent with the finding of Iwaisako and Ohki (2019), who also examined
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disruptive innovation using a quality ladder model. The result of this proposition is caused by the weak-
form Arrow effect: incumbents with a high adjusted quality lose much of their value when they wash
their hands of current technology; thus, incumbents with a high adjusted quality tend not to conduct
disruptive innovation.26
We also confirm
∂θc10 (gQ)
∂gQ
> 0,
∂θc20 (gQ)
∂gQ
> 0 and
∂T˜ (θ0,gQ)
∂gQ
< 0, and interpret these results as follows. A
marginal increment of gQ decreases the growth rate of the expected net benefit from disruptive innovation,
which increases the marginal loss from putting off disruptive innovation. Then, incumbents move the
timing of disruptive innovation forward.27We depict the relationship between T˜ and θ0 in Figure 3.1. The
horizontal axis represents θ0 and the vertical axis represents T˜ . The timing of disruptive innovation, T˜ ,
slopes upward in θ0 with given gQ, and shifts downward when gQ increases.
T¯
θc10 (gQ) θ
c1
0
(
g′Q
)
θc20 (gQ) θ
c2
0
(
g′Q
)
T˜
(
θ0, g
′
Q
)
T˜ (θ0, gQ)
T˜
θ0
Figure 3.1. Relationship between T˜ and θ0 in Figure 3.1. Here, gQ < g
′
Q.
Moreover, we can confirm
∂θc10 (gQ)
∂sD
< 0,
∂θc20 (gQ)
∂sD
< 0,
∂T˜ (θ0,gQ)
∂sD
> 0,
∂θc10 (gQ)
∂sF
> 0,
∂θc20 (gQ)
∂sF
> 0,
∂T˜ (θ0,gQ)
∂sF
< 0,
∂θc10 (gQ)
∂T¯
= 0,
∂θc20 (gQ)
∂T¯
> 0 and
∂T˜ (θ0,gQ)
∂T¯
= 0. We can interpret these results as fol-
lows. First, on one hand, a subsidy (tax) for disruptive innovation by incumbents decreases (increases)
the cost of disruptive innovation, which then increases (decreases) the expected discounted net benefit
from disruptive innovation with given gQ. On the other hand, a subsidy (tax) for innovation by entrants
stimulates (mitigates) competition, which decreases (increases) the expected initial value of incumbents,
and the expected discounted net benefit from disruptive innovation decreases (increases) with given gQ.
26In the context of empirical studies, as in Igami (2017), this effect is called “cannibalization”.
27Strictly speaking, there are two other effects from a marginal increment of gQ. One is a marginal increment of gQ that
decreases instantaneous profit, which decreases the marginal benefit from putting off the disruptive innovation. The other
is a marginal increment of gQ that decreases the level of expected net benefit from disruptive innovation, which in turn
decreases the marginal loss from putting off disruptive innovation. We can easily confirm that these two opposite effects
offset each other; then, the only effect that remains is a marginal increment of gQ that decreases the growth rate of the
expected net benefit from disruptive innovation.
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The decrement (increment) of expected discounted net benefit from disruptive innovation decreases (in-
creases) the marginal loss from putting off the disruptive innovation, and then the timing of disruptive
innovation moves later (earlier). Second, a change of patent length has no effect on the marginal benefit
from putting off radical innovation or on the marginal loss of that with given gQ, and then a change of
patent length does not affect the timing of disruptive innovation as long as gQ does not change.
28
Substituting (4), (11) and (31) into (19) yields:
V0 (θ0, 0, s) =
EL(s)
Q(s) X0 for θ0 ≤ θ
c1
0 (gQ)
V1 (θ0, 0, s) =
EL(s)
Q(s) X1 (θ0, gQ) for θ
c1
0 (gQ) < θ0 < θ
c2
0 (gQ)
V2 (θ0, 0, s) =
EL(s)
Q(s) X2 (θ0, gQ) for θ0 ≥ θ
c2
0 (gQ)
, (37)
and
X0 = [sF cF − sDcD]
X1 (θ0, gQ) =


θ0
σ
1−exp[−[ρ−gL+gQ−gθ ]T˜ (θ0,gQ)]
ρ−gL+gQ−gθ
+exp
[
− [ρ− gL + gQ] T˜ (θ0, gQ)
]
[sF cF − sDcD]


X2 (θ0, gQ) =
θ0
σ
1−exp[−[ρ−gL+gQ−gθ]T¯ ]
ρ−gL+gQ−gθ
+ exp
[
− [ρ− gL + gQ] T¯
]
[sF cF − sDcD]
,
where θc10 , θ
c2
0 , and T˜ (θ0, gQ) satisfy (36). From these equations, we can obtain some properties with
respect to the value of incumbents. First, we can confirm ∂X0
∂θ0
= 0, ∂X0
∂gQ
= 0, ∂
2X0
∂θ0∂gQ
= 0, ∂X0
∂sD
< 0, ∂X0
∂sF
>
0, ∂
2X0
∂θ0∂sD
= 0, ∂
2X0
∂θ0∂sF
= 0, and ∂X0
∂T¯
= 0, and interpret these results as follows. All incumbents drawing
θ0 ≤ θ
c1
0 decide not to produce differentiated goods and conduct disruptive innovation immediately.
Thus, there is no difference between incumbents drawing θ0 ≤ θ
c1
0 (:
∂X0
∂θ0
= 0, ∂
2X0
∂θ0∂gQ
= 0, ∂
2X0
∂θ0∂sD
= 0).
Because gQ does not affect the expected net benefit from disruptive innovation as long as the timing of
disruptive innovation is immediately after their entry, it does not affect the value of incumbents drawing
θ0 ≤ θ
c1
0 (:
∂X0
∂gQ
= 0). A subsidy (tax) for disruptive innovation by incumbents and a tax (subsidy) for
innovation by entrants increases (decreases) the expected net benefit from disruptive innovation. Thus,
a marginal decrement (increment) of sD and a marginal increment (decrement) of sF increases the value
of incumbents drawing θ0 ≤ θ
c1
0 (:
∂X0
∂sD
< 0, ∂X0
∂sF
> 0). Because incumbents drawing θ0 ≤ θ
c1
0 conduct
disruptive innovation before patent protection expires, a marginal change of patent length has no direct
28The reason
∂θc20
∂T¯
> 0 is trivial is as follows. We suppose that the incumbent drawing θ0a conducts disruptive innovation
as soon as T¯ time has passed after entry. In this case, θ0a = θc2a is satisfied. When patent length extends T¯
′ from T¯ , what
happens? Because
∂T˜(θ0,gQ)
∂T¯
= 0, the incumbent drawing θ0a continues to conduct disruptive innovation when T¯ time
has passed after entry. That is, an incumbent drawing θ0a conducts disruptive innovation before patent protection expires,
θ0a < θ
c2′
a .
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effect on their value (: ∂X0
∂T¯
= 0).
Second, we can confirm
∂X1(θ0,gQ)
∂θ0
> 0,
∂X1(θ0,gQ)
∂T˜
= 0,
∂X1(θ0,gQ)
∂gQ
< 0,
∂2X1(θ0,gQ)
∂θ0∂gQ
< 0,
∂X1(θ0,gQ)
∂sD
< 0,
∂X1(θ0,gQ)
∂sF
> 0,
∂2X1(θ0,gQ)
∂θ0∂sD
> 0,
∂2X1(θ0,gQ)
∂θ0∂sF
< 0, and
∂X1(θ0,gQ)
∂T¯
= 0, and we interpret these results
as follows. Incumbents drawing θc10 ≤ θ0 ≤ θ
c2
0 enjoy monopoly profit until they conduct disruptive
innovation, which is optimally chosen to maximize their value. A marginal increment of θ0 increases
discounted instantaneous monopoly profit for any period, which increases the value of incumbents drawing
θc10 ≤ θ0 ≤ θ
c2
0 (:
∂X1(θ0,gQ)
∂θ0
> 0). A marginal increment of T˜ extends the period enjoying monopoly
profit, which increases the value of incumbents. However, a marginal increment of T˜ decreases the
expected discounted net benefit from disruptive innovation. From (13), T˜ is determined to offset these
two opposite effects. Therefore, a marginal increment of T˜ has no effect on X1 (:
∂X1(θ0,gQ)
∂T˜
= 0). A high
growth rate of Q decreases the value of incumbents through two channels. On one hand, it makes the
relative obsolescence rate high, and then, the discounted instantaneous monopoly profit decreases. On the
other hand, it makes the growth rate of the expected discounted net benefit from disruptive innovation
low, and then, the expected discounted net benefit from disruptive innovation decreases. Thus, through
these tow same direction effects, a marginal increment of gQ decreases the value of incumbents drawing
θc10 ≤ θ0 ≤ θ
c2
0 (:
∂X1(θ0,gQ)
∂gQ
< 0). A marginal increment of gQ, on one hand, decreases the discounted
instantaneous monopoly profit of incumbents drawing high θ0, larger relative to incumbents drawing
low θ0. A marginal increment of gQ, on the other hand, decreases the discounted net benefit from
the disruptive innovation of incumbents drawing high θ0, larger relative to incumbents drawing low θ0.
Thus, a marginal increment of gQ decreases the value of incumbents drawing high θ0, larger relative
to incumbents drawing low θ0 (:
∂2X1(θ0,gQ)
∂θ0∂gQ
< 0). For the same reason as X0, a marginal decrement
(increment) of sD and a marginal increment (decrement) of sF increases the value of incumbents (:
∂X1(θ0,gQ)
∂sD
< 0,
∂X1(θ0,gQ)
∂sF
> 0). A marginal decrement (increment) of sD and a marginal increment
(decrement) of sF increases (decreases) the expected discounted net benefit from disruptive innovation,
which increases (decreases) the value of incumbents drawing high θ0, smaller relative to incumbents
drawing low θ0 because incumbents drawing high θ0 tend to set the timing of disruptive innovation later,
and then obtain a smaller benefit from disruptive innovation relative to incumbents drawing low θ0 (:
∂2X1(θ0,gQ)
∂θ0∂sD
> 0,
∂2X1(θ0,gQ)
∂θ0∂sF
< 0). For the same reason as X0, a marginal change of patent length has no
direct effect on their value (:
∂X1(θ0,gQ)
∂T¯
= 0).
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Finally, we can confirm
∂X2(θ0,gQ)
∂θ0
> 0,
∂X2(θ0,gQ)
∂gQ
< 0,
∂2X2(θ0,gQ)
∂θ0∂gQ
< 0,
∂X2(θ0,gQ)
∂sD
< 0,
∂X2(θ0,gQ)
∂sF
> 0,
∂2X2(θ0,gQ)
∂θ0∂sD
= 0,
∂2X2(θ0,gQ)
∂θ0∂sF
= 0, and
∂X2(θ0,gQ)
∂T¯
> 0, and interpret these results as follows. Incumbents
drawing θ0 > θ
c2
0 enjoy monopoly profits until their patent protection expires. They conduct innovation
immediately after their patent protection expires, irrespective of θ0. A marginal increment of θ0 increases
the discounted instantaneous monopoly profit for any period, and then increases the incumbents’ value
drawing θ0 > θ
c2
0 (:
∂X2(θ0,gQ)
∂θ0
> 0). For the same reason as X1, a marginal increment of gQ decreases the
instantaneous profit and the value of incumbents drawing high θ0, larger relative to incumbents drawing
low θ0 (:
∂X2(θ0,gQ)
∂gQ
< 0,
∂2X2(θ0,gQ)
∂θ0∂gQ
< 0). For the same reason as X0 and X1, a marginal decrement
(increment) of sD and a marginal increment (decrement) of sF increase the value of incumbents (:
∂X2(θ0,gQ)
∂sD
< 0,
∂X2(θ0,gQ)
∂sF
> 0). Because incumbents drawing θ0 > θ
c2
0 conduct disruptive innovation
after T¯ time has passed from the entry, irrespective of θ0, there is no difference in expected discounted
net benefit from disruptive innovation between incumbents drawing θ0 > θ
c2
0 . Thus, a marginal change
of sD and sD has the same effect on the value of incumbents drawing θ0 > θ
c2
0 (:
∂2X2(θ0,gQ)
∂θ0∂sD
= 0,
∂2X2(θ0,gQ)
∂θ0∂sF
= 0). Because a marginal increment of T¯ extends periods enjoying monopoly profit, it
increases the value of incumbents drawing θ0 > θ
c2
0 (:
∂X2(θ0,gQ)
∂T¯
> 0). 29
Substituting (31) and (37) into (21), we obtain:
θc10∫
θmin0
X0dG (θ0) +
θc20∫
θc10
X1dG (θ0) +
θmax0∫
θc20
X2dG (θ0) = sF cF if θ
min
0 ≤ θ
c1
0
θc20∫
θmin0
X1dG (θ0) +
θmax0∫
θc20
X2dG (θ0) = sF cF if θ
c1
0 < θ
min
0 ≤ θ
c2
0
θmax0∫
θmin0
X2dG (θ0) = sF cF if θ
c2
0 < θ
min
0
. (38)
Equation (38) determines the equilibrium value of gQ.
In the following, we investigate the properties of the equilibrium value of gQ. Because
∂X0
∂gQ
= 0,
∂X1
∂gQ
< 0, ∂X2
∂gQ
< 0, ∂X0
∂sD
< 0, ∂X1
∂sD
< 0 and ∂X2
∂sD
< 0 are satisfied, we can obtain:
dgQ
dsD
= −
θc10 (gQ)∫
θmin0
∂X0
∂sD
dG (θ0) +
θc20 (gQ)∫
θc10 (gQ)
∂X1(θ0,gQ)
∂sD
dG (θ0) +
θmax0∫
θc20 (gQ)
∂X2(θ0,gQ)
∂sD
dG (θ0)
θc20 (gQ)∫
θc10 (gQ)
∂X1(θ0,gQ)
∂gQ
dG (θ0) +
θmax0∫
θc20 (gQ)
∂X2(θ0,gQ)
∂gQ
dG (θ0)
< 0. (39)
29In appendix C, we confirm these results analytically.
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This condition implies that a subsidy (tax) for disruptive innovation by incumbents increases (decreases)
the growth rate of the improvement level of differentiated goods. The intuition is as follows. A subsidy
(tax) for disruptive innovation by incumbents increases (decreases) the expected discounted net benefit
from disruptive innovation for all incumbents, and then the expected initial value of incumbents increases
with a given gQ. An increment (decrement) of expected initial value of incumbents accelerates (deceler-
ates) entry, which continues until the free entry condition is satisfied. An acceleration (deceleration) of
entry raises (lowers) the growth rate of the number of differentiated goods gn, which raises (lowers) the
growth rate of the improvement level of differentiated goods gQ.
Because ∂X0
∂gQ
= 0, ∂X1
∂gQ
< 0, ∂X2
∂gQ
< 0, cF =
∂X0
∂sF
≥
∂X1(θ0,gQ)
∂sF
≥
∂X2(θ0,gQ)
∂sF
, and T¯ > 0 are satisfied,
we can obtain:30
dgQ
dsF
=
cF −
θc10 (gQ)∫
θmin0
∂X0
∂sF
dG (θ0)−
θc20 (gQ)∫
θc10 (gQ)
∂X1(θ0,gQ)
∂sF
dG (θ0)−
θmax0∫
θc20 (gQ)
∂X2(θ0,gQ)
∂sF
dG (θ0)
θc20 (gQ)∫
θc10 (gQ)
∂X1(θ0,gQ)
∂gQ
dG (θ0) +
θmax0∫
θc20 (gQ)
∂X2(θ0,gQ)
∂gQ
dG (θ0)
< 0. (40)
This condition implies that a subsidy (tax) for innovation by entrants increases (decreases) the growth
rate of the improvement level of differentiated goods. The intuition is as follows. A subsidy (tax) for
innovation by entrants affects equation (38) through two channels. On one hand, it decreases (increases)
the expected discounted net benefit from disruptive innovation for all incumbents, and then the expected
initial value of incumbents, EV , decreases (increases) with a given gQ. On the other hand, it decreases
(increases) the cost of initial investment for entrants, sFCF . Because the latter effect dominates the
former, the net expected benefit from entry, EV − sFCF , increases (decreases) with a given gQ. This
accelerates (decelerates) entry, which continues until the free entry condition is satisfied. An acceleration
(deceleration) of entry raises (lowers) the growth rate of the number of differentiated goods gn, which
raises (lowers) the growth rate of the improvement level of differentiated goods gQ.
30When T¯ > 0, cF >
∂X1(θ0,gQ)
∂sF
and cF >
∂X2(θ0,gQ)
∂sF
are satisfied. Then, the numerator of this equation is unambigu-
ously positive.
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Because ∂X0
∂gQ
= 0, ∂X1
∂gQ
< 0, ∂X2
∂gQ
< 0, ∂X0
∂T¯
= 0, ∂X1
∂T¯
= 0, and ∂X2
∂T¯
> 0 are satisfied, we can obtain:
dgQ
dT¯
=
−
θmax0∫
θc20 (gQ)
∂X2(θ0,gQ)
∂T¯
dG (θ0)
θc20 (gQ)∫
θc10 (gQ)
∂X1(θ0,gQ)
∂gQ
dG (θ0) +
θmax0∫
θc20 (gQ)
∂X2(θ0,gQ)
∂gQ
dG (θ0)
> 0. (41)
This condition implies that extending (shortening) the patent length increases (decreases) the growth
rate of the improvement level of differentiated goods. The intuition is as follows. Extending (shortening)
the patent length extends (shortens) the period incumbents drawing θ0 > θ
c2
0 enjoy monopoly profit,
and the value of incumbents drawing θ0 > θ
c2
0 increases (decreases), which increases (decreases) the
expected initial value of incumbents with a given gQ. An increment (decrement) of expected initial value
of incumbents accelerates (decelerates) entry, which continues until the free entry condition is satisfied.
An acceleration (deceleration) of entry raises (lowers) the growth rate of the number of differentiated
goods gn, which raises (lowers) the growth rate of the improvement level of differentiated goods gQ.
From (39), (40), and (41), we can write the equilibrium value of gQ, which is determined by (38), as
a function of policy variables:
g∗Q = gQ
(
sD, sF , T¯
)
, (42)
where
∂gQ(sD,sF ,T¯)
∂sD
< 0,
∂gQ(sD,sF ,T¯)
∂sF
< 0, and
∂gQ(sD,sF ,T¯)
∂T¯
> 0.
Substituting (33) and (42) into (30), we can confirm that the growth rate of this economy increases
proportionally with gQ, and is expressed as:
g∗u =
1
σ − 1
g∗Q. (43)
Substituting (42) into (36), we obtain the equilibrium value of θc10 , θ
c2
0 , and T˜ (θ0). In the following, we
investigate the property of the equilibrium value of θc10 , θ
c2
0 , and T˜ (θ0).
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Differentiating (36) with sD, we can obtain:
31
dθc10 (gQ)
dsD
= σ
∂gQ(sD,sF ,T¯)
∂sD
[sF cF − sDcD]− σ [r + gQ] cD < 0
dθc20 (gQ)
dsD
= exp
[
[−gθ] T¯
] dθc10 (gQ)
dsD
< 0
dT˜ (θ0,gQ)
dsD
= − 1
[−gθ ]θc10
dθc10 (gQ)
dsD
> 0
. (44)
This condition implies that a subsidy (tax) for disruptive innovation by incumbents moves the timing of
disruptive innovation by each incumbent earlier (later). The intuition is as follows. On one hand, a subsidy
(tax) for disruptive innovation by incumbents increases (decreases) the expected discounted net benefit
from disruptive innovation, and then the marginal loss from putting off disruptive innovation increases
(decreases). On the other hand, a subsidy (tax) for disruptive innovation by incumbents stimulates
(mitigates) innovation by entrants, which decreases (increases) the growth rate of the expected net benefit
from disruptive innovation, gC , and then the marginal loss from putting off disruptive innovation increases
(decreases). Because these two effects are in same direction, we can obtain the above unambiguous result.
As shown in Appendix D, we obtain:32
dθc10 (gQ)
dsF
= σ
∂gQ(sD,sF ,T¯)
∂sF
[sF cF − sDcD] + σ [r + gQ] cF > 0
dθc20 (gQ)
dsF
= exp
[
[−gθ] T¯
] dθc10 (gQ)
dsF
> 0
dT˜ (θ0,gQ)
dsF
= − 1
[−gθ ]θc10
dθc10 (gQ)
dsF
< 0
. (45)
This condition implies that a subsidy (tax) for innovation by entrants moves the timing of disruptive
innovation by each incumbent later (earlier). The intuition is as follows. On one hand, a subsidy (tax)
for innovation by entrants decreases (increases) the expected discounted net benefit from disruptive
innovation, and thus, the marginal loss from putting off disruptive innovation decreases (increases). On
the other hand, a subsidy (tax) for innovation by entrants stimulates (mitigates) innovation by entrants,
which decreases (increases) the growth rate of the expected net benefit from disruptive innovation, gC ,
and thus, the marginal loss from putting off disruptive innovation increases (decreases). Although these
two effects are in opposite directions, the former effect dominates the latter; thus, we can obtain an
31Since
∂gQ(sD,sF ,T¯)
∂sD
< 0,
dθc10 (gQ)
dsD
is unambiguously negative. Because θc20
(
gQ
)
is an increasing function of θc10
(
gQ
)
and T˜
(
θ0, gQ
)
is a decreasing function of θc10
(
gQ
)
,
dθc20 (gQ)
dsD
is negative and
dT˜(θ0,gQ)
dsD
is positive.
32Since
∂θc10 (gQ)
∂gQ
< 0, the sign of
dθc10 (gQ)
dsF
seems to be ambiguous. However, we can obtain an unambiguous result by
calculating in detail.
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unambiguous result. 33
Because
∂gQ(sF ,sD,T¯)
∂T¯
> 0, we can obtain:
dθc10 (gQ)
dT¯
= σ
∂gQ(sD,sF ,T¯)
∂T¯
[sF cF − sDcD] > 0
dθc20 (gQ)
dT¯
= exp
[
[−gθ] T¯
] dθc10 (gQ)
dT¯
> 0
dT˜ (θ0,gQ)
dT¯
= − 1
[−gθ ]θc10
dθc10 (gQ)
dT¯
< 0
. (46)
This condition implies that extending (shortening) the patent length moves the timing of disruptive
innovation by each incumbent forward (later). This result is somewhat counterintuitive because a longer
patent length makes incumbents decide front-loading switch of their current technology. However, the
interpretation is simple: extending the patent length stimulates innovation by entrants, which decreases
the growth rate of the expected net benefit from disruptive innovation, gC , and then the marginal loss
from putting off disruptive innovation increases.34
From (44), (45), and (46), we can write the equilibrium value of θc10 as a function of the policy variable:
θc1∗0 = θ
c1
0
(
sD, sF , T¯
)
, (47)
where
∂θc10 (sD,sF ,T¯)
∂sD
< 0,
∂θc10 (sD,sF ,T¯)
∂sF
> 0 and
∂θc10 (sD,sF ,T¯)
∂T¯
> 0. 35
We summarize the above discussion in the following proposition:
Proposition 3.2. When we specify the innovation technology as CF (t) =
E(t)L
Q(t) cF , and CD (t) =
E(t)L
Q(t) cD, we obtain the following results.
• A subsidy (tax) for disruptive innovation by incumbents stimulates (mitigates) innovation by en-
trants, and then increases (decreases) the growth rate of the economy.
• A subsidy (tax) for disruptive innovation by incumbents moves the timing of disruptive innovation
by each incumbent earlier (later), and the number of incumbents conducting disruptive innovation
33This result is consistent with the result of Iwaisako and Ohki (2019), in which a subsidy (tax) for innovation by
followers makes innovation by each individual leader small. They interpreted this result as follows. On one hand, a subsidy
for followers decreases leaders’ expected discounted net benefit from innovation. On the other hand, a subsidy for innovation
by followers increases replacement risk, which decreases current value, and then the Arrow effect weakens. Although these
two effects are in opposite directions, the former effect dominates the latter; thus, they show that the effect of a subsidy for
innovation by followers on the “individual effect” is unambiguously negative.
34This result does not mean that all incumbents move the timing of disruptive innovation forward. Incumbents drawing
initial adjusted quality θ0 > θc20 conduct disruptive innovation when their patent protection expires. Then, their disruptive
innovation is moved later.
35We can write the equilibrium value of θc20 and T˜
(
θ0, gQ
)
as a function of θc10
(
sD, sF , T¯
)
: θc2∗0 = exp
[
[−gθ] T¯
]
θc1∗0 ,
and T˜ ∗ = 1
−gθ
ln
[
θ0
θc1∗0
]
.
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before their patent protection expires increases (decreases).
• A subsidy (tax) for innovation by entrants stimulates (mitigates) innovation by entrants, and then
increases (decreases) the growth rate of the economy.
• A subsidy (tax) for innovation by entrants moves the timing of disruptive innovation by each in-
cumbent later (earlier), and the number of incumbents conducting disruptive innovation before their
patent protection expires decreases (increases).
• Extension (shortening) of patent length stimulates (mitigates) innovation by entrants, and then
increases (decreases) the growth rate of the economy.
• Extending (shortening) the patent length moves the timing of disruptive innovation by each in-
cumbent earlier (later), and increases (decreases) the number of incumbents conducting disruptive
innovation before their patent protection expires.
Next, we derive the equilibrium values of the average quality of differentiated goods, Θ. From the
first row of (27) and (47), if θc10 ≥ θ
min
0 is satisfied, we obtain the equilibrium value of the average quality
of differentiated goods as:
Θ∗ =
k
k − 1
θc1∗0 . (48)
, which is an increasing function of the expectation of initial adjusted quality, k/(k − 1), and is an
increasing function of the equilibrium value of the critical level of initial adjusted quality in terms of
whether the incumbent conducts production, θc10 .
36 The intuition is as follows. A high expectation of
initial adjusted quality makes adjusted quality with given gθ high at any time. High θ
c1
0 , which means
low T˜ , denotes that incumbents conduct disruptive innovation earlier, and then incumbents having low
adjusted quality tend to exit the market earlier. Thus, high adjusted quality differentiated goods tend to
remain, which raises the average quality of remaining differentiated goods.
Because we have already confirmed
∂θc1∗0
∂sD
< 0,
∂θc1∗0
∂sF
> 0, and
∂θc1∗0
∂T¯
> 0, we can confirm ∂Θ
∗
∂sD
< 0,
∂Θ∗
∂sF
> 0, and ∂Θ
∗
∂T¯
> 0. Then, we obtain following proposition:
36If θc10 ≥ θ
min
0 is not satisfied, the equilibrium values of the average quality of differentiated goods is determined from
the second or third row of (27). We refer to this case when we conduct numerical analysis.
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Proposition 3.3. When we specify the innovation technology as CF (t) =
E(t)L
Q(t) cF , and CD (t) =
E(t)L
Q(t) cD, and when the average quality of differentiated goods is sufficiently large, we get the following
results.
• A subsidy (tax) for disruptive innovation by incumbents stimulates (mitigates) disruptive innovation
by incumbents, and then increases (decreases) the average quality of differentiated goods.
• A subsidy (tax) for innovation by entrants mitigates (stimulates) disruptive innovation by incum-
bents, and then decreases (increases) the average quality of differentiated goods.
• Extending (shortening) patent length stimulates (mitigates) disruptive innovation by incumbents,
and then increases (decreases) the average quality of differentiated goods.
Substituting the equilibrium value of gQ, ν, and Θ into (32), we obtain the equilibrium value of
consumption per capita, E. From (32), consumption per capita is affected by policy variables through
three channels. First, consumption per capita is a decreasing function of gQ. An increment of gQ requires
resources devoted to innovation activity by entrants, which decreases resources devoted to production
activity. Second, consumption per capita is a decreasing function of ν. An increment of ν requires
resources devoted to innovation activity by incumbents, which decreases resources devoted to production
activity. Third, consumption per capita is an increasing function of Θ. An increment of Θ strengthens the
positive externality of innovation activity, which requires fewer resources with a given level of innovation
activity by entrants and incumbents. Then, resources devoted to production activity increase with an
increment of Θ. From these three effects, it is difficult to confirm analytically the effects of policy variables
on consumption per capita. In the following, we conduct a numerical analysis to confirm the effects of
policy variables visually.
Following precedent studies, we set parameter values ρ = 0.04, gL = 0.01, and σ = 6.
37 In addition,
we set cD = 1 as the standard relative to cF .
In Figure 1, we confirm the effect of changing policy variables with different efficiency of innovation
by entrants, cF . We examine the case where cF = 3, cF = 5, and cF = 7 while setting gθ = −0.02,
k = 2. 38 The first row of Figure 1 expresses the relationship between the growth rate of Q, gQ, and
37From Jones and Williams (2000), we interpret the interest rate as the expected internal rate of return to R&D projects,
and we set ? = 0.04. From the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2007), the average annual rate of population
growth in the US between 1975 and 2007 was around 1%, so we set gL = 0.01. From Basu (1996) and Norrbin (1993), the
average price markup over marginal cost, σ
σ−1
, has been estimated as ranging between 1.05 and 1.4, so we set σ = 6, which
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Figure 1: A numerical analysis changing cF
policy variables. First, we can confirm that gQ is a decreasing function of sF and sD, and an increasing
function of T¯ , which is consistent with proposition 3.2. Second, gQ increases rapidly when sF and sD
are very low; however, gQ increases slowly when T¯ is very large.
39 Third, for any policy variable, the
growth rate of Q is large when cF is low. This means that a high cF makes it expensive to enter the
market, which discourages entry. Discouraging entry reduces the growth rate of the small number of
differentiated goods, which reduces gQ.
The second row of Figure 1 expresses the relationship between the average quality of differentiated
goods, Θ, and policy variables. The broken line of θc10 = 1 helps us confirm whether the equilibrium is
θc10 ≥ θ
min
0 or θ
c1
0 < θ
min
0 .
40 If the average quality is greater (smaller) than the broken line, θc10 ≥ θ
min
0
(θc10 < θ
min
0 ) is satisfied. First, if θ
c1
0 ≥ θ
min
0 is satisfied, we can confirm that the average quality, Θ, is
a decreasing function of sD and an increasing function of sF . This result is consistent with proposition
means the markup is 1.2.
38The first column examines the effect of a subsidy (tax) on innovation for entrants, the second examines the effect of a
subsidy (tax) on disruptive innovation for incumbents, and the third examines the effect of patent length.
39A subsidy for innovation for incumbents and entrants increases the expected profit from entry, and thus, the expected
value of incumbents must decrease through an increment of gQ to satisfy the free entry condition. Because
∂X1
∂gQ
< 0,
∂X2
∂gQ
< 0, ∂
∂gQ
∂X1
∂gQ
> 0, and ∂
∂gQ
∂X2
∂gQ
> 0 are satisfied, the expected value of incumbents decreases less when gQ is
large than when gQ is small. When sF and sD are very low, gQ is large, and then gQ must increase more to satisfy the
free entry condition. High T¯ increases the expected value of incumbents with given gQ through extending the duration
of instantaneous profit. This benefit is enjoyed only by incumbents drawing a high initial adjusted quality. Incumbents
enjoying this effect decrease when T¯ is very high, and the effect that high T¯ enlarges the expected value of incumbents is
reduced when T¯ is very high.
40Since we set k = 2, θc10 = 1 is satisfied when Θ = 2, from (48).
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3.3. Second, if θc10 ≥ θ
min
0 is satisfied, Θ, is an increasing function of T¯ when gQ > 0 is satisfied, however,
is independent of T¯ when gQ = 0. An increment of T¯ makes disruptive innovation active through a
increment of gQ, and the this effect does not work as long as gQ = 0. Third, if θ
c1
0 < θ
min
0 is satisfied, Θ
can increase despite a small sF . This is because the average quality of any vintage decreases over time
if θc10 < θ
min
0 . Small sF leads to high gQ, which increases the ratio of new differentiated goods, which
have a high quality on average. If this effect dominates the effect that small sF leads to small disruptive
innovation, the average quality can be raised with a small sF . We can confirm this case when sF is low
in the second column of the left panel. Fourth, if θc20 < θ
min
0 is satisfied, Θ can increase with a small T¯ .
When T¯ is small, θc20 becomes small, and tends to be less than θ
min
0 . In this case, all incumbents conduct
no disruptive innovation until their patent protection expires, and then a small T¯ makes the timing of
disruptive innovation for all incumbents earlier. An earlier technological switch for all incumbents raises
the average quality of differentiated goods. We can confirm this case when T¯ is low in the second column
of the right panel. Fifth, if θc10 ≥ θ
min
0 is satisfied, Θ is large when cF is high for any policy variables. On
one hand, a high cF makes the expected return to disruptive innovation high and stimulates disruptive
innovation. On the other hand, a high cF leads to a small gQ, which discourages disruptive innovation.
These two effects are in the opposite direction; however, our numerical result shows that the former
effect dominates the latter. Sixth, if θc10 < θ
min
0 is satisfied, Θ can be greater when cF is small. When
θc10 < θ
min
0 , the average quality is an increasing function of gQ. Then, the effect that a high cF leads to
a small gQ, which decreases Θ with a given level of disruptive innovation, is added. If this additive effect
dominates the effect that a high cF leads to active disruptive innovation with a given gQ, Θ is large with
a low cF . We can confirm this case when sF is low in the second column of the left panel. Seventh, if
θc20 < θ
min
0 and gQ = 0 are satisfied, Θ is independent of cF . If θ
c2
0 < θ
min
0 is satisfied, the effect that a
high cF leads to active disruptive innovation does not work. Moreover, if gQ = 0 is satisfied, the effect
that a high cF leads to a small gQ, which decreases Θ, does not work. We can confirm this case when sD
is high in the second column of the center panel. 41
The third row of Figure 1 expresses the relationship between consumption per capita, E, and policy
variables. First, if gQ > 0 is satisfied, E is an increasing function of sF . An increment of sF decreases gQ
and increases ν and Θ.42 On one hand, a decrement of gQ and an increment of Θ leads to consumption
41Using L’Hopital’s rule in the third row of (27) when gn = 0, Θ =
k
k−1
1
T¯
1−exp[−gθ ]T¯
[−gθ ]
is satisfied. We can easily confirm
that Θ is independent of cF .
42If θc10 < θ
min
0 is satisfied, an increment of sF can decrease Θ, however, this effect is negligibly small.
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per capita being large, while on the other hand, an increment of ν reduces consumption per capita. Our
numerical result shows that the former effect dominates the latter. Second, if gQ = 0 is satisfied, E is a
decreasing function of sF . In this case, the effect that an increment of sF decreases gQ does not work.
Then, the effect that an increment of sF increases Θ cannot dominate the effect that an increment of sF
increases ν, as shown in our numerical result.43 Third, if gQ > 0 is satisfied, E is an increasing function
of sD . An increment of sD decreases gQ, ν and Θ. On the one hand, a decrement of gQ and ν leads
to large consumption per capita, on the other hand, a decrement of Θ leads to small consumption per
capita. Our numerical result shows that the former effect dominates the latter. Fourth, even if gQ = 0 is
satisfied, E is an increasing function of sD. In this case, the effect that an increment of sD decreases gQ
does not work; however, only the effect that an increment of sD decreases ν dominates the effect that an
increment of sF decreases Θ, as shown in our numerical result. Fifth, if gQ > 0 is satisfied, E temporarily
decreases with high T¯ when gQ increases rapidly; however, E shifts from decreasing to increasing when
the increment of gQ becomes small, and E converges to a finite value. On one hand, high T¯ leads to
large gQ and large disruptive innovation by incumbents drawing θ0 < θ
c2
0 , which makes consumption
per capita small. On the other hand, high T¯ leads to large Θ, and high T¯ makes incumbents drawing
θ0 > θ
c2
0 put off disruptive innovation, which leads to large consumption per capita. Our numerical result
shows that the former effects dominate the latter when gQ increases rapidly; however, the former effects
become weak when the increment of gQ becomes small, and then the latter effects dominate the former.
We also confirm that these two effects are balanced, and that E does not change when T¯ is very large.
Sixth, if gQ = 0 is satisfied, E is an increasing function of T¯ . If gQ = 0 is satisfied, the effect that high
T¯ leads to large innovation by both incumbents and entrants does not work. Then, E increases with
high T¯ through the effect that high T¯ moves the timing of disruptive innovation for incumbents drawing
θ0 > θ
c2
0 later. Seventh, if gQ > 0 is satisfied, E is large when cF is high for any policy variable. High cF
requires large resources with a given gQ, which directly makes consumption per capita small. When cF
is high, for any policy variable, gQ is small, and ν and Θ are large. On one hand, small gQ and large Θ
make consumption per capita large. On the other hand, large ν and high cF itself make consumption per
capita small. Our numerical result shows that the former effect dominates the latter. Eighth, if gQ = 0
is satisfied, E is small when cF is high. In this case, the effect that high cF leads to small gQ and the
43When gQ = 0, the labor market clearing condition is expressed as E =
[
σ−1
σ
+ k−1
k
[θc10 ]
k−1
[−kgθ ]
1−exp[−[−kgθ ]T¯ ]
cD
]−1
. From this
function, E is a decreasing function of θc10 .
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Figure 2: A numerical analysis of changing gθ
direct resource effect of cF do not work. Our numerical result shows that the effect that high cF leads to
large Θ cannot dominate the effect that high cF makes large ν.
In Figure 2, we confirm the effect of changing policy variables with different growth rates of adjusted
quality, gθ. We examine the case that gθ = −0.01, gθ = −0.02, and gθ = −0.03 while setting cF = 5,
k = 2. Although a tendency of the effect of changing policy variables is similar to the above numerical
analysis, there are some points worth noting. First, gQ is small when the absolute value of gθ is high for
any policy variable. When the obsolescence rate is high, the profit of incumbents decreases rapidly, and
then the expected value of incumbents with given gQ is low, which discourage entry. Second, if gQ > 0
is satisfied, Θ is small when the absolute value of gθ is high. A high obsolescence rate makes gQ small
(gC large), which decreases the marginal loss from putting off disruptive innovation and makes disruptive
innovation small. Third, if gQ = 0 and θ
c1
0 ≥ θ
min
0 are satisfied, Θ is not affected by gθ. As discussed
in section 2.7, the average quality of any vintage is not affected by gθ as long as θ
c1
0 ≥ θ
min
0 is satisfied.
We can confirm this case when sF is high in the second column of the left panel. Fourth, if gQ = 0 and
θc10 < θ
min
0 are satisfied, Θ is small when the absolute value of gθ is high, which is also discussed in section
2.7. We can confirm this case when sD is high in the second column of the center panel. Fifth, if gQ > 0
is satisfied, E is large when the absolute value of gθ is high. A high obsolescence rate makes gQ and Θ
small. From (25), a high obsolescence rate increases ν through the direct effect; however, it decreases ν
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Figure 3: A numerical analysis changing k
through a decrement of gQ. On one hand, small gQ and the indirect effect of ν lead to large consumption
per capita. On the other hand, small Θ and the direct effect of ν lead to small consumption per capita.
Our numerical result shows that the former effect dominates the latter. Sixth, if gQ = 0 is satisfied, E is
small when the absolute value of gθ is high. In this case, the effect that a high absolute value of gθ leads
to small gQ and the indirect effect of ν does not work. Then, only the effect that a high absolute value
of gθ leads to small Θ and the direct effect of ν remains, which leads to consumption per capita being
small.
In Figure 3, we confirm the effect of changing policy variables with a different expected value of θ0,
k
k−1 . We examine the case where k = 1.8, k = 2, and k = 2.2 while setting cF = 5, gθ = −0.02.
44 In
regard to Figure 3, there are some points worth noting.45 First, for any policy variable, gQ is small when
k is high. When k is high, the expected value of the initial adjusted quality is low, which lowers expected
profit. Then, the expected value of incumbents with given gQ is small, which discourages entry. Second,
for any policy variable, Θ is small when k is high. High k makes gQ small, which raises the incentive
to put off disruptive innovation. Moreover, high k itself leads to average quality with a given level of
disruptive innovation, and then Θ is small with high k even when gQ is satisfied. Third, if gQ > 0 is
44 k
k−1
= 2.25, k
k−1
= 2, and k
k−1
= 1.83 when k = 1.8, k = 2, and k = 2.2, respectively.
45When k is different, θc10 takes a different value with given Θ. Then, we draw three broken lines in the second column
of figure 3 to confirm whether the equilibrium is θc10 ≥ θ
min
0 , or θ
c1
0 < θ
min
0 when k = 1.8, k = 2, and k = 2.2 respectively.
31
satisfied, E is large when k is high. High k makes gQ, ν, and Θ small. On one hand, small gQ and ν
lead to large consumption per capita. On the other hand, small Θ leads to small consumption per capita.
Our numerical result shows that the former effect dominates the latter. Fourth, if gQ = 0 is satisfied, E
is small when k is high. When gQ = 0 is satisfied, the effect that high k leads to small gQ does not work.
Our numerical result shows that the effect that high k leads to ν being small dominates the effect that
high k makes Θ small.
3.2 The Case Where CF (t) =
E(t)L(t)
n(t)[Θ]γ
cF and CD (t) =
E(t)L(t)
n(t)[Θ]γ
cL
In this section, we generalize the externality from the improvement level of differentiated goods as:
CF (t) =
E(t)L(t)
n(t)[Θ]γ cF CD (t) =
E(t)L(t)
n(t)[Θ]γ cL
. (49)
These technology functions contain a positive externality from average quality and the number of differ-
entiated goods, and a negative externality from market scale. We restrict the parameter γ ≥ 1. 46 For
simplicity, we also restrict our analysis to where θc10 ≥ θ
min
0 = 1 and gQ > 0 are satisfied.
The labor market clearing condition is expressed as:
E (t)
[
σ − 1
σ
+
ν
[Θ]
γ cD +
gQ
[Θ]
γ cF
]
= 1. (50)
From (50), in the BGP equilibrium, gE = 0 must be satisfied, and then the growth rate of innovation
cost is gC = gL − gQ.
47
Necessary conditions for the maximization problem T˜ are expressed as:48
θc10 (gQ) = [σ [ρ− gL + gQ] [sF cF − sDcD]]
1
γ
[
k−1
k
] γ−1
γ
θc20 (gQ) = exp
[
[−gθ] T¯
]
θc10 (gQ)
T˜ (θ0, gQ) =
1
−gθ
ln
[
θ0
θc10
]
. (51)
Because we generalize the externality from the improvement level of differentiated goods, the incentive for
disruptive innovation is affected by the average quality of differentiated goods. On one hand, a high av-
46When γ = 1, this specification coincides with the previous section.
47gθ < 0 must be satisfied not to break the sufficient condition of the maximization problem of T˜ .
48(15) is expressed as θc10
(
gQ
)
= σ
[
ρ− gL + gQ
]
[sF cF − sDcD] [Θ]
1−γ . If θc10 ≥ θ
min
0 = 1 is satisfied, we obtain (51).
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erage quality of differentiated goods decreases the expected net benefit from disruptive innovation, which
decreases the marginal loss from putting off disruptive innovation. On the other hand, a high average
quality of differentiated goods also decreases the instantaneous profit of incumbents, which decreases the
marginal benefit from putting off disruptive innovation. When γ = 1, these two opposing effects offset
each other completely. For γ > 1, the former effect dominates the latter, and then the high average
quality of differentiated goods decreases the marginal loss from putting off disruptive innovation relative
to the marginal benefit. Thus, incumbents move the timing of disruptive innovation later with given gQ,
and the average quality of differentiated goods, Θ = k
k−1θ
c1
0 , is smaller than when γ = 1 with given gQ.
The initial values of an incumbent entering at time s and drawing θ0 is expressed as:
V (θ0, 0, s) =
EL(s)
n(s)
[
k
k−1θ
c1
0 (gQ)
]
−γ
X0 for θ0 ≤ θ
c1
0
V (θ0, 0, s) =
EL(s)
n(s)
[
k
k−1θ
c1
0 (gQ)
]
−γ
X1
(
θ0, gQ, θ
c1
0 (gQ)
)
for θc10 ≤ θ0 ≤ θ
c2
0
V (θ0, 0, s) =
EL(s)
n(s)
[
k
k−1θ
c1
0 (gQ)
]
−γ
X2
(
θ0, gQ, θ
c1
0 (gQ)
)
for θ0 > θ
c2
0
, (52)
where
X0 = [sF cF − sDcD]
X1
(
θ0, gQ, θ
c1
0 (gQ)
)
=


θ0
σ
1−exp[−[ρ−gL+gQ−gθ]T˜ (θ0,gQ)]
ρ−gL+gQ−gθ
[
k
k−1θ
c1
0 (gQ)
]γ−1
+exp
[
− [ρ− gL + gQ] T˜ (θ0, gQ)
]
[sF cF − sDcD]


X2
(
θ0, gQ, θ
c1
0 (gQ)
)
=


θ0
σ
1−exp[−[ρ−gL+gQ−gθ ]T¯ ]
ρ−gL+gQ−gθ
[
k
k−1θ
c1
0 (gQ)
]γ−1
+exp
[
− [ρ− gL + gQ] T¯
]
[sF cF − sDcD]


, (53)
where θc10 , θ
c2
0 , and T˜ (θ0, gQ) satisfy (51). The value of the incumbent is composed of two parts: aggregate
discounted instantaneous profits and expected discounted net profit from disruptive innovation. On one
hand, aggregate discounted instantaneous profits are proportional to EL/Q, while on the other hand, the
expected discounted net benefit from disruptive innovation is proportional to the innovation technology,
as in (31) and (49). In the model of section 3.1, for simplicity, we specify innovation technology to
be proportional to EL/Q, which makes the value of the incumbent proportional to EL/Q. In the
present section, we generalize the externality from the average quality of differentiated goods, and then
the expected discounted net benefit from disruptive innovation is proportional to EL
/(
Q [Θ]
γ−1
)
. An
increment of Θ decreases aggregate discounted instantaneous profits to be smaller than the expected
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discounted net benefit from disruptive innovation when γ > 1. Because we multiply Θ−γ before X0, X1,
and X2 to simplify the free entry condition, X1 and X2 are increasing functions of Θ.
The free entry condition is expressed as:
θc10 (gQ)∫
1
X0dG (θ0) +
θc20 (gQ)∫
θc10 (gQ)
X1
(
θ0, gQ, θ
c1
0 (gQ)
)
dG (θ0) +
∞∫
θc20 (gQ)
X2
(
θ0, gQ, θ
c1
0 (gQ)
)
dG (θ0) = sF cF .
(54)
(51) and (54) determine the equilibrium value of gQ. Substituting the equilibrium value of gQ into (51),
we obtain the equilibrium values of θc10 , θ
c2
0 , and T˜ . Substituting the equilibrium value of θ
c1
0 into (27),
we obtain the equilibrium value of Θ. Substituting the equilibrium value of gQ into (30), we obtain the
equilibrium value of the growth rate of this economy, gu. Substituting the equilibrium values of gQ and
θc10 into (50), we obtain the equilibrium value of E.
Regarding the effect of a subsidy (tax) for innovation by entrants, we obtain the interesting result:49
dgQ
dsF
< 0 if γ < k
dgQ
dsF
= 0 if γ = k
dgQ
dsF
> 0 if γ > k
. (55)
We can interpret this result as follows. As discussed in the previous section, a decrement of sF (the
subsidy for entrants) simultaneously makes EV and the cost of innovation by entrants small; however,
EV decreases less than the cost of innovation by entrants when γ = 1. Thus, gQ must increase, which
decreases EV , to satisfy the free entry condition. When γ > 1 is satisfied, X1 and X2 are increasing
functions of Θ. A decrement of sF decreases the expected profit from disruptive innovation with given
gQ, which mitigates disruptive innovation and makes Θ small. Then, the subsidy for entrants makes X1
and X2 small through a decrement of Θ with given gQ, and this effect is strengthened with high γ. Thus,
when γ is sufficiently high (γ > k), a decrement of sF decreases EV more than the cost of innovation by
entrants. Thus, gQ must decrease to satisfy the free entry condition.
Regarding the effect of a subsidy (tax) for disruptive innovation by incumbents and the effect of
extending (shortening) patent length, we obtain a result similar to that in the previous section, as well
49In appendix (D), we can confirm (55) analytically. The signs of
dgQ
dsD
,
dgQ
dT¯
, dθ0
dsF
, dθ0
dsD
, and dθ0
dT¯
are the same as those
in the previous section.
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as the following proposition:
Proposition 3.4. When we specify the innovation technology as CF (t) =
E(t)L(t)
n(t)[Θ]γ cF and CD (t) =
E(t)L(t)
n(t)[Θ]γ cL, we get the following results.
If γ < k is satisfied,
• A subsidy (tax) for disruptive innovation by entrants stimulates (mitigates) innovation by entrants,
and then increases (decreases) the growth rate of the economy.
If γ = k is satisfied,
• A subsidy (tax) for disruptive innovation by entrants does not affect innovation by entrants or the
growth rate of the economy.
If γ > k is satisfied,
• A subsidy (tax) for disruptive innovation by entrants mitigates (stimulates) innovation by entrants,
and then decreases (increases) the growth rate of the economy.
Regardless of the magnitude of the correlation between γ and k, we obtain the following results.
• A subsidy (tax) for disruptive innovation by incumbents and an extension (shortening) of patent
length stimulate (mitigate) innovation by entrants, and then increase (decrease) the growth rate of
the economy.
• A subsidy (tax) for disruptive innovation by incumbents, tax (subsidy) for innovation by entrants,
and extension (shortening) of patent length move the timing of disruptive innovation by each in-
cumbent earlier (later), and the number of incumbents conducting disruptive innovation before their
patent protection expires increases (decreases).
This proposition shows that a subsidy for entrants decreases not only disruptive innovation by incum-
bents, but also innovation by entrants if the positive externality from the average quality is sufficiently
strong, which decreases both the growth rate of the economy and the average quality of differentiated
goods. Many related studies have concluded that support for entrants and the deregulation of barriers
to entry stimulate economic growth.50 The present paper considers firm heterogeneity and the timing of
50Regarding a welfare analysis, however, related studies have noted that there can be some cases where support for
entrants and deregulation of barriers to entry harm social welfare.
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Figure 4: A numerical analysis of changing γ < k
incumbents switching their current technology, and these settings make the average quality endogenous.
Because support for entrants and deregulation of barriers decrease the incentive to switch current tech-
nology, the average quality of differentiated goods decreases endogenously.51 If the positive externality
of innovation from average quality is strong, support for entrants decreases the value of incumbents more
relative to entry cost. Then, the incentive to entry decreases, which decreases gQ. This interesting result
implies that deregulation does not always stimulate economic growth, and that the role of disruptive
innovation is important.
Next, we conduct a numerical analysis focused on γ.52 In Figure 4, we confirm the effect of changing
policy variables with different γ < k. We examine the case where γ = 1, γ = 1.3, γ = 1.5, and γ = 1.8
while setting cF = 5, gθ = −0.02, k = 2, and σ = 16.
53 Regarding Figure 4, there are some points worth
noting. First, for any policy variables, gQ is large when γ is high. When γ is high, the cost of innovation
decreases more than the expected value of incumbents with given gQ, which encourages entry. Then, gQ
must be large with high γ to satisfy the free entry condition. Second,for any policy variables, Θ is large
when γ is high. This result is somewhat counterintuitive because from (51), Θ is small with high γ with
given gQ. However, high γ leads to large gQ, which increases the marginal loss from putting off disruptive
51Note that a decrement of sF itself decreases the expected benefit from disruptive innovation with given gQ.
52Note that we restrict our analysis to where θc10 ≥ θ
min
0 = 1 and gQ > 0 are satisfied.
53We set a high σ = 16 to obtain a plausible growth rate. When σ = 16, the markup is 1.06.
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Figure 5: A numerical analysis changing γ ≥ k
innovation and makes disruptive innovation large. Our numerical result shows that this effect dominates
the former. Third, for any policy variables, E is small when γ is high. High γ leads to large gQ, ν, and
Θ. On one hand, large Θ leads to consumption per capita being large; on the other hand, large gQ and ν
lead to consumption per capita being small. Our numerical result shows that the latter effect dominates
the former.
In Figure 5, we confirm the effect of changing policy variables with different γ ≥ k. We examine the
case where γ = 2, γ = 2.05, γ = 2.1, and γ = 2.15 while setting cF = 5, gθ = −0.02, k = 2, and σ = 16.
Regarding Figure 5, there are some points worth noting. First, gQ is independent of sF when γ = k.
Second, gQ is an increasing function of sF when γ > k is satisfied. These features are consistent with
proposition 3.4. Third, we can confirm that this other feature is similar to Figure 4.
3.3 The Case Where CF (t) =
1
Q(t)
cF and CD (t) =
1
Q(t)
cD
In the previous two sections, we consider the negative externality of innovation caused by market size.
This setting enables us to analyze gQ and Θ without considering the labor market clearing condition.
However, in this setting, we cannot examine how population size affects key endogenous variables like
gQ, Θ, and E. In this section, we eliminate this useful assumption and specify the innovation technology
37
as:
CF (t) =
1
Q(t)cF CD (t) =
1
Q(t)cD
. (56)
These technology functions contain a positive spillover from the improvement level of differentiated goods;
however, there is no negative externality from market scale. With this specification, the labor market
clearing condition affects the equilibrium value of θc10 , θ
c2
0 , T˜ (θ0), gQ, andΘ; thus, these values are
dependent on population size. In this section, we restrict our analysis to where θc10 ≥ θ
min
0 = 1, and
gL = 0 are satisfied.
54
The labor market clearing condition is expressed as:
E (t)L
σ − 1
σ
+
ν
Θ
cD +
gQ
Θ
cF = L. (57)
From (57), in the BGP equilibrium, gE = 0 must be satisfied, and then the growth rate of innovation
cost is gC = −gQ.
55
The necessary conditions of the maximization problem of T˜ are expressed as:
θc10 (gQ, E) =
1
EL
σ [ρ+ gQ] [sF cF − sDcD]
θc20 (gQ, E) = exp
[
[−gθ] T¯
]
θc10 (gQ)
T˜ (θ0, gQ, E) =
1
−gθ
ln
[
θ0
θc10
]
. (58)
Market scale increases the instantaneous profit of incumbents, which increases the marginal benefit from
putting off disruptive innovation. In the case of section 3.1, market scale also increases the expected net
profit from disruptive innovation, which increases the marginal loss from putting off disruptive innova-
tion; these two opposing effects offset each other completely. In this section, the absence of a negative
externality from market scale makes the timing of disruptive innovation depend on market scale, EL. A
large EL only increases the marginal benefit from putting off disruptive innovation, and then incumbents
move the timing of disruptive innovation later. When EL > 1 (EL < 1), this effect is greater (smaller)
than in the case of section3.1. Thus, incumbents move the timing of disruptive innovation later (earlier)
with given gQ, and the average quality of differentiated goods, Θ =
k
k−1θ
c1
0 , is smaller (greater) than the
54If these restrictions are not satisfied, analysis becomes far too complex and beyond the scope of the present paper.
55gθ < 0 must be satisfied to avoid breaking the sufficient condition of the maximization problem of T˜ .
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case of section3.1 with given gQ.
The initial values of an incumbent entering at time s and drawing θ0 is expressed as:
V (θ0, 0, s) =
1
Q(s)X0 for θ0 ≤ θ
c1
0 (gQ, E)
V (θ0, 0, s) =
1
Q(s)X1 (θ0, gQ, E) for θ
c1
0 (gQ, E) ≤ θ0 ≤ θ
c2
0 (gQ, E)
V (θ0, 0, s) =
1
Q(s)X2 (θ0, gQ, E) for θ0 > θ
c2
0 (gQ, E)
, (59)
where
X0 = [sF cF − sDcD]
X1 (θ0, gQ, E) =
θ0EL
σ
1−exp[−[ρ+gQ−gθ]T˜ (θ0,gQ)]
ρ+gQ−gθ
+ exp
[
− [ρ+ gQ] T˜ (θ0, gQ)
]
[sF cF − sDcD]
X2 (θ0, gQ, E) =
θ0EL
σ
1−exp[−[ρ+gQ−gθ ]T¯ ]
ρ+gQ−gθ
+ exp
[
− [ρ+ gQ] T¯
]
[sF cF − sDcD]
. (60)
where θc10 , θ
c2
0 , and T˜ (θ0, gQ) satisfy (58). The value of an incumbent is composed of two parts: aggregate
discounted instantaneous profits and expected discounted net benefits from disruptive innovation. On
one hand, aggregate discounted instantaneous profits are proportional to EL/Q. On the other hand,
expected discounted net benefits from disruptive innovation are proportional to 1/Q. An increment
of EL increases aggregate discounted instantaneous profits; however, it does not increase the expected
discounted net benefits from disruptive innovation. Because we multiply 1/Q (s) before X0, X1 and X2
to simplify the free entry condition, X1 and X2 are increasing functions of EL.
The free entry condition is expressed as:
θc10 (gQ,E)∫
1
X0dG (θ0) +
θc20 (gQ,E)∫
θc10 (gQ,E)
X1 (θ0, gQ, E) dG (θ0) +
∞∫
θc20 (gQ,E)
X2 (θ0, gQ, E) dG (θ0) = sF cF . (61)
From (57), (58), and (61), the equilibrium values of gQ and E are determined. Unlike the case of
section 3.1, this model captures the resource effect; however, it generates a scale effect. Substituting the
equilibrium value of gQ and E into (58), we obtain the equilibrium values of θ
c1
0 , θ
c2
0 , and T˜ . Substituting
the equilibrium value of θc10 into (27), we obtain the equilibrium value of Θ. Substituting the equilibrium
value of gQ into (30), we obtain the equilibrium value of the growth rate of this economy.
Next, we conduct a numerical analysis with this equilibrium. In Figure 6, we confirm the effect of
changing policy variables with different population size, L. We examine the case L = 0.8, L = 0.9, L = 1,
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Figure 6: A numerical analysis where CF (t) =
1
Q(t)cF and CD (t) =
1
Q(t)cD
and L = 1.1 while setting cF = 5, gθ = −0.02, k = 2. The curve tagged “basic model” expresses the
relationship between key endogenous and policy variables using the model constructed in section 3.1,
where the parameter is set as cF = 5, gθ = −0.02, k = 2, and gL = 0.
Regarding Figure 6, there are some points worth noting. First, for any policy variables, gQ is large
when L is high. When L is high, the instantaneous profit of incumbents is high, which increases the
expected value of incumbents with given gQ. Then, gQ must be large with high L to satisfy the free entry
condition.56 Second, the elasticity of gQ with respect to sF and sD is smaller when there is no negative
externality from market scale compared with the case of section 3.1. Low sF and sD stimulate innovation
by entrants, which lowers E. In the case of section 3.1, a decrement of E affects the incentive for innovation
by entrants through two channels. On one hand, a decrement of E decreases the instantaneous profit
of incumbents, which lowers the incentive for innovation by entrants. On the other hand, a decrement
of E decreases the cost of innovation by entrants, which raises the incentive for innovation by entrants.
We constructed a model in section 3.1, in which these two effects offset each other completely. However,
56In the model of the previous two sections, high L also increases the cost of innovation by entrants, which offsets
completely the effect that high L increases the expected value of incumbents.
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in the present section, we remove this useful assumption, and the latter effect does not work. Thus,
because of this resource effect, the subsidy for innovation by incumbents and entrants stimulates growth
weaker than in the case of section 3.1. 57 Third, as suggested in our analytical section, we can confirm
that gQ is greater (smaller) than in the case of section 3.1 when aggregate consumption, EL, is greater
(smaller) than 1. 58 Fourth, if gQ > 0 is satisfied, Θ is large when L is high. This result is somewhat
counterintuitive because from (58), Θ is small with high L with given gQ. However, high L leads to
large gQ, which increases the marginal loss from putting off disruptive innovation and makes disruptive
innovation large. Our numerical result shows that this effect dominates the former. Fifth, if gQ = 0 is
satisfied, Θ is small when L is high. In this case, the effect that high L leads to large gQ does not work,
and then only the effect that high L leads to small Θ with given gQ remains. Sixth, if gQ > 0 is satisfied,
E is small when L is high. High L leads to large gQ, ν, and Θ if gQ > 0 is satisfied. On one hand, large
Θ makes consumption per capita large, while on the other hand, large gQ and ν make consumption per
capita small. Our numerical result shows that the latter effect dominates the former. Seventh, if gQ = 0
is satisfied, E is large when L is high. In this case, the effect that high L leads to small gQ does not
work. Our numerical result shows that the effect that high L leads to small ν dominates the effect that
L leads to small Θ.
Many growth models derive a positive relationship between population size and the degree of innova-
tion (economic growth rate). However, as pointed out by Jones (1995), a positive relationship between
population size and economic growth rate is not observed in the real economy. Many papers attempt to
remove this irrelevant property in various ways. The result obtained in this section has a potential to
offer one new solution to the scale effect. We extend the instantaneous utility function as used in Ohki
(2015):
u (t) =



 n1∫
0
q1 (j, t) (x1 (j, t))
σ−1
σ dj


σ
σ−1


α 


 n2∫
0
q2 (j, t) (x1 (j, t))
σ−1
σ dj


σ
σ−1


1−α
(62)
where qi(j, t) and di(j, t) denote the quality and consumption volume of incumbent j in industry i at
time t, respectively, and α denotes the market share of industry 1. We assume that barriers to entry in
57On one hand, the benefit of the setting of the present section is that we can capture the resource effect and examine the
effect of population size. On the other hand, the disadvantage of the setting of the present section is that we cannot conduct
analytical analysis, and that numerical calculation takes a long time. Because the difference between the two models is
qualitatively small, we think that the assumption used in section 3.1 has sufficient validity.
58See the first and fourth rows of Figure 6.
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industry 1, cF1, are too high for any entrants, gn1 = 0. In industry 2, barriers to entry are not too high,
and thus, new entrants enter the market, gn2 > 0.
From the above discussion, high L allows active innovation by incumbents and entrants if new entrants
enter the market (gn = gQ > 0) in the equilibrium. However, high L stifles innovation by incumbents
if new entrants do not enter the market (gn = gQ = 0) in the equilibrium. If α is large, the share of
industry where new entrants do not enter the market is large. Thus, if α is large, the latter effect can
dominate the former, and we can show that high L leads to a small degree of aggregate innovation.
Because our model is designed so that innovation by incumbents does not increase the growth rate of the
economy directly, we cannot observe a negative relationship between population size and the growth rate
of the economy. However, an appropriate extension of our model enables us to design a model in which
innovation by incumbents raises the growth rate of the economy directly. In doing so, we will construct
a new endogenous growth model that overcomes the scale effect puzzle.
3.4 The Case Where CF (t) =
E(t)L(t)
Θ
cF and CD (t) =
E(t)L(t)
Θ
cL
So far, we have analyzed the economy where the number of differentiated goods grows endogenously. In
the context of the endogenous growth model, especially in the homogeneous model, the economy where
the number of differentiated goods is constant over the long run is also examined. In this section, we
examine a model where the number of differentiated goods is constant over the long run in consideration
of firm heterogeneity and disruptive innovation. We specify the innovation technology as:
CF (t) =
E(t)L(t)
Θ cF CD (t) =
E(t)L(t)
Θ cL
. (63)
These technology functions contain a positive externality from the average quality of differentiated goods
and a negative externality from market scale; however, there is no positive externality from the number
of differentiated goods.
From (26) and (63), the labor market clearing condition is expressed as:
E (t)
[
σ − 1
σ
+
ν
Θ
n (t) cL +
gQ
Θ
n (t) cF
]
= 1. (64)
From (64), in the steady-state equilibrium, gE = 0 and gn = 0 must be satisfied; then, gQ = 0, gC = 0, and
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gu = 0 are satisfied. In this economy, the steady-state equilibrium value of n is determined endogenously
instead of gQ.
The necessary conditions of the maximization problem of T˜ are expressed as:59
θc10 (n) = nσ [ρ− gL] [sF cF − sDcD]
θc20 (n) = exp
[
[−gθ] T¯
]
θc10 (n)
T˜ (θ0, n) =
1
−gθ
ln
[
θ0
θc10 (n)
]
. (65)
Large n decreases the instantaneous profit of incumbents, which in turn decreases the marginal benefit
from putting off disruptive innovation. In the case of section 3.1, large n also decreases the expected
benefit from disruptive innovation, which decreases the marginal loss from putting off disruptive innova-
tion; these two opposite effects offset each other completely. Then, the absence of a positive externality
from the number of differentiated goods makes the timing of disruptive innovation depend on n, which
decreases only the marginal benefit from putting off disruptive innovation, and incumbents move the
timing of disruptive innovation earlier with large n. 60
The initial values of an incumbent entering at time s and drawing θ0 is expressed as:
V (θ0, 0, s) =
EL
Θ X0 for θ0 ≤ θ
c1
0
V (θ0, 0, s) =
EL
Θ X1 (θ0, n) for θ
c1
0 ≤ θ0 ≤ θ
c2
0
V (θ0, 0, s) =
EL
Θ X2 (θ0, n) for θ0 > θ
c2
0
, (66)
where
X0 = [sF cF − sDcD]
X1 (θ0, n) =
1−exp[−[ρ−gθ]T˜ (θ0,n)]
ρ−gθ
θ0
nσ
+ [sF cF − sDcD] exp
[
−ρT˜ (θ0, n)
]
X2 (θ0, n) =
1−exp[−[ρ−gθ ]T¯ ]
ρ−gθ
θ0
nσ
+ [sF cF − sDcD] exp
[
−ρT¯
]
. (67)
where θc10 , θ
c2
0 , and T˜ (θ0, n) satisfy (65). The value of incumbents is composed of two parts: aggregate
discounted instantaneous profits and expected discounted net benefits from disruptive innovation. On
one hand, aggregate discounted instantaneous profits are proportional to EL/Q. On the other hand,
59gθ < 0 must be satisfied to avoid breaking the sufficient condition of the maximization problem of T˜ .
60In the model of section 3.1, gn = 0 is satisfied if the expected profit from the entry is too small. In this case, the
number of differentiated goods is constant; however, this is not determined endogenously, rather, it is exogenously given or
derived from the span when gn > 0 is satisfied and the exogenous initial value of n. In the model of section 3.1, n does not
affect other endogenous variables, which is clearly different from the model constructed in the present section.
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expected discounted net benefits from disruptive innovation are proportional to EL/Θ. An increment to
n decreases aggregate discounted instantaneous profits; however, it does not decrease expected discounted
net benefits from disruptive innovation. Because we multiply EL/Θ before X0, X1, and X2 to simplify
the free entry condition, X1 and X2 are decreasing functions of n.
The free entry condition is expressed as:
θc10 (n)∫
1
X0dG (θ0) +
θc20 (n)∫
θc10 (n)
X1 (θ0, n) dG (θ0) +
∞∫
θc20 (n)
X2 (θ0, n) dG (θ0) = sF cF , (68)
where θc10 , θ
c2
0 , and T˜ satisfy (65), and X0, X1, and X2 satisfy (67), which determines the equilibrium
value of n. Then, we can write the equilibrium value of n as a function of policy variable:
n∗ = n
(
sD, sF , T¯
)
, (69)
where
∂n(sD,sF ,T¯)
∂sD
< 0,
∂n(sD,sF ,T¯)
∂sF
< 0, and
∂n(sD,sF ,T¯)
∂T¯
> 0. Substituting (69) into (65), we obtain
the equilibrium value of θc10 .
61 Then, we can write the equilibrium value of n as a function of the policy
variable:
θc1∗0 = θ
c1
0
(
sD, sF , T¯
)
, (70)
where
∂θc10 (sD,sF ,T¯)
∂sD
< 0,
∂θc10 (sD,sF ,T¯)
∂sF
> 0 and
∂θc10 (sD,sF ,T¯)
∂T¯
> 0. Substituting (70) into (27), we
obtain the equilibrium value of the average quality. Substituting (69) and (70) into (64), we obtain the
equilibrium value of E.
We summarize the above discussion in the following proposition:
Proposition 3.5. When we specify the innovation technology as CF (t) =
E(t)L(t)
Θ cF , and CD (t) =
E(t)L(t)
Θ cL, we obtain the following results.
• A subsidy (tax) for disruptive innovation by incumbents stimulates (mitigates) innovation by en-
trants in the transition process, and then increases (decreases) the number of differentiated goods
in the steady state; however, it does not affect the growth rate in the steady state.
• A subsidy (tax) for innovation by entrants stimulates (mitigates) innovation by entrants in the
61Since θc20 and T˜ (θ0) are expressed as functions of θ
c1
0 , we can also obtain the equilibrium value of these variables.
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Figure 7: A numerical analysis changing cF , where CF (t) =
1
Q(t)cF and CD (t) =
1
Q(t)cD
transition process, and then increases (decreases) the number of differentiated goods in the steady
state; however, it does not affect the growth rate in the steady state.
• Extending (shortening) patent length stimulates innovation by entrants in the transition process,
and then increases (decreases) the number of differentiated goods in the steady state; however, it
does not affect the growth rate in the steady state.
• Regarding disruptive innovation by incumbents and the average quality of differentiated goods, the
results obtained in this section are qualitatively the same as those in section 3.1.
As follows, we conduct a numerical analysis. Although a numerical analysis where CF (t) =
E(t)L(t)
Θ cF
and CD (t) =
E(t)L(t)
Θ cL is similar to the case discussed in section 3.1, there are some points to be
considered. In Figure 7, we confirm the effect of changing variables with different efficiency of innovation
by entrants, cF . We examine the case where cF = 3, cF = 5, and cF = 7 while setting gθ = −0.02,
k = 2. Regarding Figure 7, there are some points worth noting. First, n is a decreasing function of
sF and sD, and an increasing function of T¯ , which is consistent with proposition 3.5. Second, for any
policy variable, the number of differentiated goods is large when cF is low. This result is interpreted as
follows: a high cF imposes a high cost to enter the market, which discourages entry in the transition
process. Discouragement of entry keeps the number of differentiated goods small in the steady state.
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Third, if θmin0 ≤ θ
c1
0 is satisfied, E is independent of sF . In the steady state, only disruptive innovation
by incumbents is conducted. The resources devoted to disruptive innovation increases with large n and ν
and small Θ. High sF leads to small n and large ν and Θ; however, as shown in appendix E, these three
effects offset each other completely. We can confirm this in the third row of the left panel when sF is
high. Fourth, if θmin0 > θ
c1
0 is satisfied, E increases with high sF . The effect that large ν leads to small E
is stronger than the effect that large Θ leads to large E. Then, high sF leads to small E through large ν
and Θ. If θmin0 > θ
c1
0 is satisfied, this effect is weaker than the case where θ
min
0 ≤ θ
c1
0 is satisfied because
the incentive to conduct disruptive innovation is too small. Thus, this effect cannot dominate the effect
that high sF leads to large E through small n. Fifth, for any T¯ , E does not decrease with high T¯ . In the
case of section 3.1, E temporarily decreases with high T¯ when gQ increases rapidly. However, in the case
of the present section, our numerical result suggests that this does not happen. 62 Sixth, if θmin0 ≤ θ
c1
0 is
satisfied, E is independent of cF . High cF leads to small n, large ν, and large Θ. As shown in appendix
E, these three effects offset each other completely. Seventh, if θmin0 > θ
c1
0 is satisfied, E increases with
high cF . This interpretation is similar to the reason E increases with high sF if θ
min
0 ≤ θ
c1
0 is satisfied.
In Figure 8, we confirm the effect of changing policy variables with a different growth rate of adjusted
quality, gθ. We examine the case where gθ = −0.01, gθ = −0.02, and gθ = −0.03 while setting cF = 5,
k = 2. Regarding Figure 8, there are some points worth noting. First, for any policy variable, the
number of differentiated goods is large when the absolute value of gθ is low. We interpret this result as
follows: a high absolute value of gθ decreases instantaneous profit rapidly, which discourages entry in the
transition process. Discouragement of entry means there will be a small number of differentiated goods
in the steady state. Second, for any sF , Θ is strictly high when the absolute value of gθ is low. In the
case of section 3.1, Θ takes same value when gQ = 0 and θ
min
0 ≤ θ
c1
0 are satisfied. However, in the case
of the present section, the number of differentiated goods is greater than zero, which decreases with a
high absolute value of gθ. Then, the effect that a low absolute value of gθ leads to a large Θ through
large n still works, even when sF is very high. Third, for any variable, E is large when the absolute value
of gθ is low. In the case of section 3.1, if gQ > 0 is satisfied, E is small when the absolute value of gθ
is high. In the case of section 3.1, a high absolute value of gθ leads to large E through less innovation
62In the case of section 3.1, an increment of T¯ increases gQ rapidly, which increases the resources devoted to innovation
by entrants, and then decreases the resources devoted to production. However, in the present case, innovation is conducted
only by incumbents in steady-state equilibrium. Without this effect, a difference between the case of section 3.1 and the
present case is created.
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Figure 8: A numerical analysis changing gθ, where CF (t) =
1
Q(t)cF and CD (t) =
1
Q(t)cD
by incumbents. However, in the case of the present section, disruptive innovation is conducted only by
incumbents in steady-state equilibrium, and then, this effect does not work.
In Figure 9, we confirm the effect of changing policy variables with different expected values of θ0,
k
k−1 . We examine the case where k = 1.8, k = 2, and k = 2.2 while setting cF = 5, gθ = −0.02.
Regarding Figure 9, there are some points worth noting.63 First, for any policy variable, the number
of differentiated goods is small when k is high. When k is high, the expected value of initial adjusted
quality is low, which discourages entry in the transition process. A discouragement to entry leads to a
small number of differentiated goods in the steady state. Second, for any variable, E is large when k is
high. In the case of section 3.1, if gQ = 0 is satisfied, E is small when k is high. In the case of section 3.1,
the absence of the effect that high k leads to large E through small gQ causes this result. However, in
the case of the present section, the number of differentiated goods is greater than zero, which decreases
with high k. Then, the effect that high k leads to large E through the effect that small n leads to small
resources devoted to disruptive innovation always works.
Finally, we examine the effect of degrees of externality from the average quality as in section 3.2. We
63When k is different, θc10 takes a different value with given Θ. Then, we draw three broken lines in the second column
of Figure 3 to confirm whether the equilibrium is θc10 ≥ θ
min
0 , or θ
c1
0 < θ
min
0 when k = 1.8, k = 2, and k = 2.2 respectively.
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Figure 9: A numerical analysis changing k, where CF (t) =
1
Q(t)cF and CD (t) =
1
Q(t)cD
specify R&D technology as:64
CF (t) =
1
n(t)[Θ]γ cF CD (t) =
1
n(t)[Θ]γ cL
. (71)
In Figure 10, we confirm the effect of changing policy variables with different degrees of externality
from the average quality, γ. We examine the case where γ = 1, γ = 1.3, γ = 1.5, γ = 1.8, γ = 2,
γ = 2.01, γ = 2.1, and γ = 2.15 while setting cF = 5, gθ = −0.02, and k = 2. The first row of Figure 10
expresses the relationship between the number of differentiated goods, n, and policy variables when γ < k
is satisfied. The second row of Figure 10 expresses the relationship between the number of differentiated
goods, n, and policy variables when γ ≥ k is satisfied. The third (fourth) row of Figure 10 expresses
the relationship between the average quality of differentiated goods, Θ (consumption per capita, E), and
policy variables. Regarding figure 10, there are some points worth noting. First, if γ < k is satisfied,
n is a decreasing function of sF . Second, if γ = k is satisfied, n is independent of sF . Third, if γ > k
is satisfied, n is an increasing function of sF . Interpretation of these results is similar to the reason
we obtain proposition 3.4. Fourth, if θmin0 ≤ θ
c1
0 is satisfied, Θ is independent from γ. This result is
somewhat counterintuitive because from (77), Θ is small with high γ with given n. However, high γ leads
64In Appendix E, we derive the equilibrium and confirm an important analytical result.
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Figure 10: A numerical analysis changing γ, where CF (t) =
1
Q(t)cF and CD (t) =
1
Q(t)cD
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to large n, which increases the marginal loss from putting off disruptive innovation and makes disruptive
innovation large. As shown in Appendix E, these two opposite effects offset each other completely. Fifth,
if θmin0 ≤ θ
c1
0 is satisfied, E is also independent of γ. Although Θ is independent of γ, high γ enables
incumbents to conduct disruptive innovation with few resources because of the high positive externality,
which makes E large. High γ leads to large n, which increases the number of firms conducting disruptive
innovation; this effect then leads to E being small. As shown in Appendix E, these two opposite effects
offset each other completely.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we constructed a tractable model where heterogeneous incumbents conduct innovation
to switch to new technology, and entrants conduct innovation to enter the market. We documented
new insights that have never been obtained from growth models not considering heterogeneous incum-
bents’ opportunities to switch their technology. Furthermore, there are some possibilities to develop our
model because we intended to construct a tractable model that could be used to examine more complex
situations.
The first possibility is theoretical. In our setting, disruptive innovation affects the growth rate only
through indirect effects: the degree of disruptive innovation affects the average quality, which affects
instantaneous profit and the cost of innovation by entrants, which indirectly affects the growth rate. One
can construct a model, for example, in which the degree of disruptive innovation affects the expected
initial quality of differentiated goods, which in turn enables the average quality to increase permanently;
then, disruptive innovation affects the growth rate directly. We think that this extension offers a new
method to resolve the scale effect puzzle.
A second possibility is application. In our setting, the behavior of incumbents is limited to production
and disruptive innovation. Of course, there are many potential behaviors of incumbents. Thus, one can
consider technology transfer and extend the present model to the North–South model. This can also
consider business expansion and marketing activity conducted by heterogeneous incumbents, and then
examine how these factors affect disruptive innovation and economic growth. Another extension of our
model is in regard to replacement risk: to examine the incumbents’ patent protection activity.
A third possibility is policy analysis. In our setting, we examine the effects of a subsidy (tax) for
50
innovation by incumbents and entrants and patent length. Other plausible policies, such as patent breadth
and forward protection, should be examined in future studies.
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A Appendix
We define ν (t) as the ratio of the number of differentiated goods embodying disruptive innovation to the
aggregate number of differentiated goods at time t. The number of differentiated goods invented at time
t is the number of differentiated goods embodying disruptive innovation at time t plus the number of
differentiated goods invented by entrants at time t, which is expressed as n (t) [ν (t) + gn].
Differentiated goods invented at time t having initial adjusted quality θ0 ≤ θ
c1
0 embody disruptive
innovation immediately, and then the number of differentiated goods invented at time t and disruptive
innovation conducted at time t are expressed as n (t) [ν (t) + gn]
θc10∫
θmin0
dG (θ0).
Differentiated goods invented at time t− T˜ having initial adjusted quality θ0
(
T˜
)
conduct disruptive
innovation at time t, where θ0
(
T˜
)
is the initial adjusted quality corresponding to be embodied disruptive
innovation after T˜ periods have passed from the entry, which is derived from (13). Because the num-
ber of differentiated goods invented at time t − T˜ is exp
[
−gnT˜
]
n (t)
[
ν
(
t− T˜
)
+ gn
]
, the number of
differentiated goods invented at time t − T˜ that conduct disruptive innovation at time t is expressed as
exp
[
−gnT˜
]
n (t)
[
ν
(
t− T˜
)
+ gn
]
g
(
θ0
(
T˜
))
. Because there are incumbents who have chosen the inte-
rior solution of the timing of disruptive innovation, having initial adjusted quality from θ0 (0) to θ0
(
T¯
)
,
the number of differentiated goods having initial adjusted quality θc10 < θ0 < θ
c2
0 that conduct disruptive
innovation at time t is expressed as
θc20∫
θc10
exp
[
−gnT˜ (θ0)
]
n (t)
[
ν
(
t− T˜ (θ0)
)
+ gn
]
dG (θ0).
Differentiated goods invented at time t− T¯ having initial adjusted quality θ0 ≥ θ
c2
0 conduct disruptive
innovation at time t, and then the number of differentiated goods invented at time t − T¯ that conduct
disruptive innovation at time t is expressed as exp
[
−gnT¯
]
n (t)
[
ν
(
t− T¯
)
+ gn
] θmax0∫
θc20
dG (θ0).
If θmin0 ≤ θ
c1
0 is satisfied, we can express ν (t) as:
ν (t) = ν (t)Zν1 + gnZgn1,
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where
Zν,1 =
θc10∫
θmin0
dG (θ0) +
θ20∫
θ10
exp
[
− (gn + gν) T˜ (θ0)
]
dG (θ0) + exp
[
− (gn + gν) T¯
] θmax0∫
θc20
dG (θ0)
Zgn,1 =
θc10∫
θmin0
dG (θ0) +
θ20∫
θ10
exp
[
−gnT˜ (θ0)
]
dG (θ0) + exp
[
−gnT¯
] θmax0∫
θc20
dG (θ0)
.65
As long as T˜ (θ0), θ
c1
0 , and θ
c2
0 are constant, Zν,1 and Zgn,1 are constant. When Zν,1 and Zgn,1 are
constant, ν is constant. Thus, gν = 0 is satisfied, and we obtain:
ν =
Z1
1− Z1
gn,
where Z1 =
θc10∫
θmin0
dG (θ0)+
θ20∫
θ10
exp
[
−gnT˜ (θ0)
]
dG (θ0)+exp
[
−gnT¯
] θmax0∫
θc20
dG (θ0). Substituting (9) and (18)
into this function, we obtain the first row of (25).
If θc10 < θ
min
0 < θ
c2
0 is satisfied, there are no incumbents conducting disruptive innovation immediately.
Then, we can express ν (t) as:
ν =
Z2
1− Z2
gn,
where Z2 =
θ20∫
θmin0
exp
[
−gnT˜ (θ0)
]
dG (θ0) + exp
[
−gnT¯
] θmax0∫
θc20
dG (θ0). Substituting (9) and (18) into this
function, we obtain the second row of (25).
If θc20 < θ
min
0 is satisfied, there are no incumbents conducting disruptive innovation before their patent
protection expires. Then, we can express ν (t) as:
ν =
Z3
1− Z3
gn,
where Z3 = exp
[
−gnT¯
] θmax0∫
θmin0
dG (θ0). Substituting (9) and (18) into this function, we obtain the third
row of (25).
From the above discussion, we can derive ν when gn > 0; however, this relational expression is
valueless when gn = 0.
66 Then, we have to find another way to derive ν.
When gn = 0, the number of new invented differentiated goods invented only by incumbents is
identical for all periods, and the expected value of their duration is also identical. Thus, we can express
65Here, gν is the growth rate of ν.
66When gn = 0, Z1 = Z2 = Z3 = 1 is satisfied, and then ν = νZ + gnZ becomes ν = ν.
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the ratio of the number of differentiated goods conducting disruptive innovation to the aggregate number
of differentiated goods as an inverse number of the expected value of duration. We can derive the expected
value of duration, E
(
T˜
)
, as
E
(
T˜
)
= 0
θc10∫
θmin0
dG (θ0) +
θc20∫
θc10
T˜ (θ0) dG (θ0) + T¯
θmax0∫
θc20
dG (θ0) if θ
min
0 ≤ θ
c1
0
E
(
T˜
)
=
θc20∫
θmin0
T˜ (θ0) dG (θ0) + T¯
θmax0∫
θc20
dG (θ0) if θ
c1
0 < θ
min
0 ≤ θ
c2
0
E
(
T˜
)
= T¯
θmax0∫
θmin0
dG (θ0) if θ
c2
0 < θ
min
0
.
Substituting (9) and (18) into this function, we obtain
ν =
[θc10 ]
k
k[−gθ]
1−exp[−k[−gθ]T¯ ]
if θmin0 ≤ θ
c1
0
ν = k[−gθ]
1−exp[−k[−gθ]T¯ ][θc10 ]
−k
−k ln[θc10 ]
if θc10 < θ
min
0 ≤ θ
c2
0
ν = 1
T¯
if θc20 < θ
min
0
.
Using L’Hopital’s rule, we can confirm that (25) coincides with the above equation. Thus, ν can be
expressed as (25), even when gn = 0.
B Appendix
In this appendix, we derive (27). At time t− T˜ , [ν + g] exp
[
−gnT˜
]
n (t) differentiated goods are invented.
At time t, differentiated goods invented T˜ periods before remain if inventors draw initial adjusted quality
θ0 ≥ θ0
(
T˜
)
. Because the adjusted quality of differentiated goods invented T˜ periods before having initial
adjusted quality θ0 is expressed as exp
[
gθT˜
]
θ0, the sum of adjusted quality of remaining differentiated
goods, which are invented at time t− T˜ , at time t is expressed as:
[ν + g] exp
[
−gnT˜
]
n (t)
θmax0∫
θ0(T˜)
exp
[
gθT˜
]
θ0dG (θ0)
At time t, because there are differentiated goods invented between time t− T¯ and time t, the sum of the
adjusted quality of remaining differentiated goods, which were invented between time t − T¯ and time t,
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at time t is expressed as:
T¯∫
0
[ν + g] exp
[
−gnT˜
]
n (t)
θmax0∫
θ0(T˜)
exp
[
gθT˜
]
θ0dG (θ0)dT˜ .
In a similar manner, we can derive the number of differentiated goods at time t as:
T¯∫
0
[ν + g] exp
[
−gnT˜
]
n (t)
θmax0∫
θ0(T˜)
dG (θ0)dT˜ .
The average quality of differentiated goods, Θ, is calculated as the sum of the quality of differentiated
goods produced at time t divided by the number of differentiated goods at time t, and then we obtain:
Θ =
T¯∫
0
exp
[
−gnT˜
] θmax0∫
θ0(T˜)
exp
[
gθT˜
]
θ0dG (θ0)dT˜
T¯∫
0
exp
[
−gnT˜
] θmax0∫
θ0(T˜)
dG (θ0)dT˜
.
Substituting (9) and (18) into the above equation, we obtain the first row of (27).
If θc10 < θ
min
0 is satisfied, all incumbents produce differentiated goods and put off disruptive innovation
for some time. We define T c as the time when the incumbent drawing the lowest initial adjusted quality,
θmin0 , conducts disruptive innovation. Then, we obtain the average quality of the differentiated goods as:
Θ =
T˜ c∫
0
exp
[
−gnT˜
] [θmax0∫
θmin0
exp
[
gθT˜
]
θ0dG (θ0)
]
dT˜ +
T¯∫
T˜ c
exp
[
−gnT˜
] θmax0∫
θ0(T˜)
exp
[
gθT˜
]
θ0dG (θ0)

dT˜
T˜ c∫
0
exp
[
−gnT˜
] [θmax0∫
θmin0
dG (θ0)
]
dT˜ +
T¯∫
T˜ c
exp
[
−gnT˜
] θmax0∫
θ0(T˜)
dG (θ0)

dT˜
.
Substituting (9) and (18) into the above equation, we obtain the second row of (27).
If θc20 < θ
min
0 is satisfied, all incumbents produce differentiated goods until their patent protection
expires, and then we obtain the average quality of the differentiated goods as:
Θ =
T¯∫
0
exp
[
−gnT˜
] [θmax0∫
θmin0
exp
[
gθT˜
]
θ0dG (θ0)
]
dT˜
T¯∫
0
exp
[
−gnT˜
] [θmax0∫
θmin0
dG (θ0)
]
dT˜
.
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Substituting (9) and (18) into the above equation, we obtain the second row of (27).
C Appendix
In this appendix, we examine the property of X1 (θ0, gQ) and X2 (θ0, gQ). Differentiating X1 (θ0, gQ) and
X2 (θ0, gQ) with gQ, we obtain:
∂X1(θ0,gQ)
∂gQ
= − X10
[ρ−gL+gQ][ρ−gL+gQ−gθ]
2
θ0
σ
∂X2(θ0,gQ)
∂gQ
= − X20
[ρ−gL+gQ][ρ−gL+gQ−gθ]
2
θ0
σ
where
X10 =

 [ρ− gL + gQ]
[
1− exp
[
− [ρ− gL + gQ − gθ] T˜
]]
+ [−gθ] [ρ− gL + gQ − gθ] T˜ exp
[
− [ρ− gL + gQ − gθ] T˜
]


X20 =

 [ρ− gL + gQ]
[
1− exp
[
− [ρ− gL + gQ − gθ] T¯
]]
+
[
[ρ− gL + gQ − gθ]
θc20
θ0
− [ρ− gL + gQ]
]
[ρ− gL + gQ − gθ] T¯ exp
[
− [ρ− gL + gQ − gθ] T¯
]


.
Because X10 is unambiguously positive, we can easily confirm
∂X1(θ0,gQ)
∂gQ
< 0.
When θ0 goes to positive infinity, X20 is expressed as:
lim
θ0→+∞
X20 =

 [ρ− gL + gQ]
[
1− exp
[
− [ρ− gL + gQ − gθ] T¯
]]
− [ρ− gL + gQ] [ρ− gL + gQ − gθ] T¯ exp
[
− [ρ− gL + gQ − gθ] T¯
]

 .
Because lim
θ0→+∞
X20 is an increasing function of T¯ and T¯ > 0, lim
θ0→+∞
X20 > 0 is satisfied.
67 Because
X20 is a decreasing function of θ0, we can confirm that X20 is also positive. Thus, we can confirm
∂X2(θ0,gQ)
∂gQ
< 0.
Differentiating
∂X1(θ0,gQ)
∂gQ
and
∂X2(θ0,gQ)
∂gQ
with θ0, we obtain:
∂
∂θ0
∂X1(θ0,gQ)
∂gQ
= − 1
σ[ρ−gL+gQ]
[
X10
[ρ−gL+gQ−gθ ]
2 +
1−[−gθ]T˜
[−gθ]
exp
[
− [ρ− gL + gQ − gθ] T˜
]]
∂
∂θ0
∂X2(θ0,gQ)
∂gQ
= −
lim
θ0→+∞
X20
[ρ−gL+gQ][ρ−gL+gQ−gθ ]
2
θ0
σ
.
67When T¯ = 0, lim
θ0→+∞
X20 = 0.
58
Then, we can confirm ∂
∂θ0
∂X1(θ0,gQ)
∂gQ
< 0 and ∂
∂θ0
∂X2(θ0,gQ)
∂gQ
< 0.68
Differentiating X1 (θ0, gQ) and X2 (θ0, gQ) with [sF cF − sDcD], we obtain:
∂X1(θ0,gQ)
∂[sF cF−sDcD ]
= exp
[
− [ρ− gL + gQ] T˜
]
> 0
∂X2(θ0,gQ)
∂[sF cF−sDcD ]
= exp
[
− [ρ− gL + gQ] T¯
]
> 0
.
Differentiating the above function with respect to θ0, we obtain:
∂
∂θ0
∂X1(θ0,gQ)
∂[sF cF−sDcD ]
= − [ρ− gL + gQ] exp
[
− [ρ− gL + gQ] T˜
]
∂T˜
∂θ0
< 0
∂
∂θ0
∂X2(θ0,gQ)
∂[sF cF−sDcD ]
= 0
.
D Appendix
In this appendix, we examine the sign of
dgQ
dsF
and
dθc10 (gQ)
dsF
, where R&D technology is expressed as
CF (t) =
E(t)L(t)
n(t)[Θ]γ cF and CD (t) =
E(t)L(t)
n(t)[Θ]γ cD.
Differentiating θc10 = [σ [ρ− gL + gQ] [sF cF − sDcD]]
1
γ
[
k
k−1
] 1−γ
γ
with sF yields:
dθc10
dsF
=
σ
γ
[
σ [ρ− gL + gQ] [sF cF − sDcD]
k
k − 1
] 1−γ
γ
[
[ρ− gL + gQ] cF − [sF cF − sDcD]
[
−
dgQ
dsF
]]
.
(72)
Substituting (9) and (53) into (54), we obtain:69
[sF cF − sDcD] [ρ− gL + gQ]
[[
1− exp
[
− [ρ− gL + gQ + k [−gθ]] T¯
]]
[ρ− gL + gQ + k [−gθ]]
[
θc10
]
−k
[k − 1]
]
= sDcD. (73)
Substituting (51) into (73), we obtain:
[
θc10
]γ−k [1− exp [− [ρ− gL + gQ + k [−gθ]] T¯ ]]
[ρ− gL + gQ + k [−gθ]]
=
[
k − 1
k
]γ
kσsDcD. (74)
68
[
1− [−gθ] T˜
] [
exp
[
−
[
ρ+ gQ − gθ
]
T˜
]]
is a decreasing function of T˜ , and is zero when T˜ = 0. Since T˜ is positive,[
1− [−gθ] T˜
] [
exp
[
−
[
ρ+ gQ − gθ
]
T˜
]]
is also positive.
69Regardless of the specification of CF and CD, (73) is satisfied as long as θ
c1
0 ≥ θ
min
0 is satisfied.
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Differentiating (74) with sF , and substituting (72) yields:
[γ − k] cF
γ [sF cF − sDcD]
=
dgQ
dsF
[[
1−
[
1 + [ρ− gL + gQ + k [−gθ]] T¯
]
exp
[
− [ρ− gL + gQ + k [−gθ]] T¯
]][
1− exp
[
− [ρ− gL + gQ + k [−gθ]] T¯
]]
[ρ− gL + gQ + k [−gθ]]
−
[γ − k]
γ [ρ− gL + gQ]
]
.
(75)
First, left-hand-side of (75) increases with γ, and brackets of right-hand-side decreases with γ. Then,
d
dγ
dgQ
dsF
> 0 must be satisfied; that is,
dgQ
dsF
must increase monotonically with high γ. Second, from (75),
dgQ
dsF
= 0 must be satisfied when γ = k. Thus,
dgQ
dsF
is negative (positive) when γ < k (γ > k) is satisfied.
Then, we can confirm the sign of
dgQ
dsF
expressed as (55).
We can rewrite (75) as:
dθc10
dsF
=
[
1
γ − k
dgQ
dsF
]
θc10
[
1−
[
1 + [ρ− gL + gQ + k [−gθ]] T¯
]
exp
[
− [ρ− gL + gQ + k [−gθ]] T¯
]][
1− exp
[
− [ρ− gL + gQ + k [−gθ]] T¯
]]
[ρ− gL + gQ + k [−gθ]]
.
From (55),
[
1
γ−k
dgQ
dsF
]
> 0 is satisfied.70 We can easily confirm that
[
1−
[
1 + [ρ− gL + gQ + k [−gθ]] T¯
]
exp
[
− [ρ− gL + gQ
0 is satisfied when T¯ > 0. Thus,
dθc10
dsF
> 0 must be satisfied.
In the case of section 3.1, which is the special case of section 3.2, γ = 1 is satisfied. Because we
assume a Pareto distribution where k > 1, we can confirm that
dgQ
dsF
< 0 and
dθc10
dsF
> 0 are satisfied, and
we obtain the result of propositions 3.2 and 3.3.
E Appendix
In this appendix, we conduct an analytical analysis where R&D technology is expressed as CF (t) =
E(t)L
[Θ]γ cF and CD (t) =
E(t)L
[Θ]γ cD.
The labor market clearing condition is expressed as:
E
[
σ − 1
σ
+
ν
[Θ]
γ ncD +
gn
[Θ]
γ ncF
]
= 1. (76)
From this equation, in steady-state equilibrium, gE = 0 and gn = 0 must be satisfied, and then gQ = 0,
gu = 0, and gC = gL are satisfied.
70Since d
dγ
dgQ
dsF
> 0, we can confirm
[
1
γ−k
dgQ
dsF
]
> 0 is satisfied, even when γ = k by using L’Hopital’s rule.
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Necessary conditions for the maximization problem of T˜ are expressed as:71
θc10 (n) =
[
k−1
k
] γ−1
γ [nσ [ρ− gL] [sF cF − sDcD]]
1
γ
θc20 (n) = exp
[
[−gθ] T¯
]
θc10 (n)
T˜ (θ0, n) =
1
−gθ
ln
[
θ0
θc10 (n)
]
. (77)
The initial values of an incumbent entering at time s and drawing θ0 are expressed as:
V (θ0, 0, s) =
EL(s)
[Θ]γ X0 for θ0 ≤ θ
c1
0
V (θ0, 0, s) =
EL(s)
[Θ]γ X1
(
θ0, n, θ
c1
0 (n)
)
for θc10 ≤ θ0 ≤ θ
c2
0
V (θ0, 0, s) =
EL(s)
[Θ]γ X2
(
θ0, n, θ
c1
0 (n)
)
for θ0 > θ
c2
0
, (78)
where
X0 = [sF cF − sDcD]
X1
(
θ0, n, θ
c1
0 (n)
)
=


1−exp[−[ρ−gL−gθ]T˜ (θ0,n)]
ρ−gL−gθ
θ0
nσ
[
k
k−1θ
c1
0 (n)
]γ−1
+ [sF cF − sDcD] exp
[
− [ρ− gL] T˜ (θ0, n)
]


X2
(
θ0, n, θ
c1
0 (n)
)
=


1−exp[−[ρ−gL−gθ]T¯ ]
ρ−gL−gθ
θ0
nσ
[
k
k−1θ
c1
0 (n)
]γ−1
+ [sF cF − sDcD] exp
[
− [ρ− gL] T¯
]


. (79)
where θc10 , θ
c2
0 , and T˜ (θ0, gQ) satisfy (77).
We restrict our analysis to where θmin0 ≤ θ
c1
0 is satisfied, and then the free entry condition is expressed
as:
θc10∫
θmin0
X0dG (θ0) +
θc20∫
θc10
X1
(
θ0, n, θ
c1
0 (n)
)
dG (θ0) +
θmax0∫
θc20
X2
(
θ0, n, θ
c1
0 (n)
)
dG (θ0) = cF (80)
where θc10 , θ
c2
0 , and T˜ satisfy (77), and X0, X1, and X2 satisfy (79), which determines the equilibrium
value of n. Substituting the equilibrium value of n into (77), we obtain the equilibrium value of θc10 .
Substituting the equilibrium value of θc10 into (27), we obtain the equilibrium value of average quality.
Next, we confirm the sign of dn
dsF
and
dθc10 (gQ)
dsF
. Differentiating θc10 =
[
k−1
k
] γ−1
γ [nσ [ρ− gL] [sF cF − sDcD]]
1
γ
71gθ < 0 must be satisfied not to violate the sufficient condition of the maximization problem of T˜ .
61
with sF , we obtain:
dθc10
dsF
sF
θc10
=
1
γ − k
dn
dsF
sF
n
. (81)
Because (73) is satisfied regardless of the specification of R&D technology, substituting (77) into (73),
we obtain:
[
θc10 (n)
]γ−k 1
n
=
[
k − 1
k
]γ
[ρ− gL + k [−gθ]]
1− exp
[
− [ρ− gL + k [−gθ]] T¯
]kσsDcD. (82)
Differentiating (82) with sF and substituting (81) yields:
1
n
dn
dsF
=
γ − k
k
cF
sF cF − sDcD
. (83)
From (83), we can confirm the sign of dn
dsF
, expressed as:
dn
dsF
< 0 if γ < k
dn
dsF
= 0 if γ = k
dn
dsF
> 0 if γ > k
, (84)
From (84) and (81), we can confirm
dθc10 (gQ)
dsF
> 0.
Next, we confirm that the equilibrium value of average quality Θ is independent of γ. The free entry
condition is rewritten as:
[
θc10
]k
[k − 1] cD
[sF cF − sDcD] [ρ− gL]
=
1− exp
[
− [ρ− gL + k [−gθ]] T¯
]
[ρ− gL + k [−gθ]] sD
. (85)
From this equation, we can confirm that θc10 is independent of γ. Thus, Θ =
k
k−1θ
c1
0 is also independent
of γ.
Finally, we confirm that the equilibrium value of consumption per capita is independent of sF , cF , and
γ if θc1 ≥ θmin0 is satisfied. Because gQ = 0 is satisfied, the labor market clearing condition is expressed
as:
E
[
σ − 1
σ
+
ν
[Θ]
γ ncD
]
= 1.
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Thus, we can confirm the result about consumption per capita by analyzing ν[Θ]γ ncD. If θ
c1 ≥ θmin0 is
satisfied, from the first rows of (25) and (27), we obtain:
ν
[Θ]
γ ncD =
[
θc10
]k
[k − 1] cD
[sF cF − sDcD] [ρ− gL]
[−gθ]
σ
[
1− exp
[
−k [−gθ] T¯
]] . (86)
Substituting (85) into this equation, we obtain:
ν
[Θ]
γ ncD =
1− exp
[
− [ρ− gL + k [−gθ]] T¯
]
1− exp
[
−k [−gθ] T¯
] [−gθ]
[ρ− gL + k [−gθ]]σsD
. (87)
From (87), we can confirm that ν[Θ]γ ncD is independent from sF , cF , and γ. Thus, E is also independent
of sF , cF , and γ.
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